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The United States is involved in a substantial
reconfiguration of its overseas military bases that requires negotiating
new base agreements with prospective host nations and amending old
agreements with others. U.S. officials must grapple with the effects of
anti-base social movements during this process. However, if history is
any indication, these officials are unlikely to succeed fully. Both the
United States's historical approach and much of the relevant scholarship
on military bases underemphasize an important issue in the negotiation
of base agreements: the domestic political contexts of host nations.
Borrowing from social movements theory, this Article argues that the
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United States needs to take into account the structural determinants of
successful anti-base mobilization in order to understand fully its
bargaining position and to produce effective base agreements. The
Article uses comparative case studies on anti-base movements in
Okinawa and the Philippines to explain that the concept of "political
opportunity structure" can be used to achieve these ends.
INTRODUCTION

Over the past half century, the United States has relied on its
overseas military bases to protect its interests and meet a range of
national security goals.'
Bases in East Asia, for example, were
indispensable during both the Korean War and Vietnam. 2 U.S. facilities
in the Pacific facilitated intelligence gathering, operated as logistics and
command centers, and enabled rapid deployment to conflict zones.3 In
Europe, too, an expansive network of bases abetted the U.S. effort to
foster stability and contain Soviet influence during the Cold War.4
Extensive U.S. reliance on foreign bases, however, did not
diminish with the fall of the Soviet Union. According to the Department
of Defense, the United States currently owns or rents a total of 860
military installations in approximately 40 foreign countries.5 Motivated

1 See generally ROBERT E. HARKAVY, BASES ABROAD: THE GLOBAL FOREIGN
MILITARY PRESENCE (1989) (discussing in the second half of the book how the

United States and other major powers have used military bases in order to gather
intelligence, conduct research, project power, and bolster deterrence).
2 See ANNI P. BAKER, AMERICAN SOLDIERS OVERSEAS 76, 155 (2004) (noting

how bases in Asia provided critical personnel and supplies during the Korean
War and Vietnam).
3 ROBERT E. HARKAVY, GREAT POWER COMPETITION FOR OVERSEAS BASES:

THE GEOPOLITICS OF ACCESS DIPLOMACY 130-43 (1982).
4 See SIMON DUKE, UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN

EUROPE 7-11 (1989) (discussing the historical rationale for the U.S. military
iresence in Europe).
Department of Defense, Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2004 Baseline,
available

at

http://www.defenselink.miVpubs/20040910 2004BaseStructureReport.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006). These numbers do not take into account U.S. bases in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, or Qatar). See Chalmers
Johnson, the Arithmetic of America's Military Bases Abroad: What Does It All
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by strategic demands related to the war on terrorism, the Pentagon is
today developing a basing strategy that will establish several new foreign
installations while reducing reliance on others. 6 Poland, Bulgaria, and
Romania will reportedly house new U.S. facilities before long.7 The
Bush administration may also establish several permanent military bases
in Iraq and Afghanistan.8 Facilities in Central Asia will facilitate the war
on terrorism. 9
Newly established bases in the Middle East and Eastern Europe,
in addition to others that the Bush administration will soon establish, are
elements of a massive transformation in the layout of U.S. military
installations overseas, a transformation so dramatic that it constitutes a
"big bang" in forward deployment strategy.10 Not since the beginning of
the Cold War has the United States so drastically restructured its network
of foreign bases." In the short term, these bases are supposed to
facilitate the war on terrorism and increase U.S. influence over states
such as Iran and Syria. In the long term, the bases may contain a rising
Add

Up

to?,

History

News

Network

(Jan.

19,

2004),

at

http://hnn.us/articles/3097.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
6 Lisa Burgess, Europe Forces Shift Not Seen Until '06, STARS & STRIPES EUR.
available
at
(Feb.
3,
2004),
ED.
http://www.military.comNewContent/0, 13190,SS _020304 Europe,00.html;
Facilities,
Global
Security.org,
at
Introduction:
U.S.
Military
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2004).
7Brian Whitmore, US Looks Eastto Set Up New EuropeBases, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 12, 2003, at Al.
8 See Afghan Paper Says US Planning Permanent Bases to Stage Regional
Operations,BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., Mar. 2, 2005; Thorn Shanker & Eric
Schmitt, Pentagon Expects Long-term Access to Key Iraq Bases, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2003, at Al.
9 Robert G. Kaiser, US. Plants Footprintin Shaky Central Asia, WASH. POST,
Aug. 27, 2002, at A1; US. General's Visit Aimed at Setting Up Military Base,
BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., Apr. 2, 2005; Manas International Airport, Ganci
at
Global
Security.org,
Air
Base,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/manas.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2005).
'0 Kurt M. Cambell & Celeste Johnson Ward, New Battle Stations?, FOREIGN
AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 102-03.
IId.
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China, much like bases in Germany, Greece, and Japan contained the
Soviet Union years ago.
Despite the United States's continuing reliance on foreign
military bases, it cannot set up new installations abroad or maintain its
current installations without imposing substantial burdens on receiving
states) 2 Noisy military aircraft, base-related crime, environmental
degradation, and the threat of attack from enemies of the United States
are all significant drawbacks to housing U.S. forces, and these problems
have consistently generated discontent in host nations. Residents of
Okinawa, for example, have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in their
prefecture since the early post-World War II period,13 and citizens of the
Philippines did similarly until the removal of U.S. bases in 1991 14 Antibase protests have also become increasingly strident among South
Korean citizens in recent years.1 5 In each of these countries and several
others, angry citizens have coalesced to form social movements. These
citizens have picketed, petitioned, held referenda, and demanded reform.
These social movements should matter to the United States.
Anti-U.S. military base movements reflect the legitimate grievances of
foreign citizens who host U.S. forces, and they affect the United States's
ability to station its troops abroad. Organized opposition to bases in the
Philippines required the Philippine government to alter its negotiating
strategy with the United States on base-related issues and eventually led
to the expiration of the two countries' military base agreement) 6 AntiAmerican sentiment in Saudi Arabia during the U.S. war in Afghanistan
12 See, e.g., Outline of U.S. Bases on Okinawa, Military Base Affairs Office,
Okinawa
Prefecture,
available
at
http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid = 14&id=662&page =
I (last visited Oct. 23, 2005) (providing statistics on land use, accidents, and
crime related to U.S. bases in Okinawa).
13 See KENSEI YOSHIDA, DEMOCRACY BETRAYED: OKINAWA UNDER U.S.

OCCUPATION 33 (2001).
14 See WILLIAM E. BERRY, U.S. BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE EVOLUTION
OF
THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 37 (Westview Press 1989) (explaining that by the

early 1950s, the "reservoir of good will" toward the United States receded and
that resentment toward the U.S. presence began to increase).
IS James Brooke, Threats and Responses: The Troops; G. 's in South Korea
Encounter
IncreasedHostility, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A3.
16

See BERRY, supra note 14, at 288-89 (explaining how the anti-base opposition
forced the Philippine government to alter its negotiating strategy).
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5

prevented Saudi officials from allowing the United States to fly sorties
from their territory."7 Today, the United States is repositioning its forces
in South Korea in part because of widespread Korean discontent.' 8
Given that bases are and will likely remain an important
component of U.S. foreign policy, and given that anti-base movements
have constrained the United States's ability to operate bases overseas, it
is important to consider the conditions that enable anti-base movements
to achieve their aims. Clearly, not all movements are successful. For
example, while opposition to U.S. military bases in the Philippines
precipitated U.S. force withdrawal in 1991, bases remain in Okinawa,
even though citizens there have protested the U.S. presence for decades.
Being able to explain why some anti-base movements fail while
others succeed would help the United States to proactively adapt base
agreements to the political contexts of receiving states-an outcome that
could both increase the sustainability of the U.S. forward deployment
strategy and reduce the burden that that strategy places on host nations.
Being able to anticipate effective anti-base movements would also allow
the United States to manage its configuration of bases more efficiently
by reducing the need for diplomatically costly, post hoc amendments to
base agreements, and by helping to identify proactively local populations
that will most require appeasement.
The ongoing reconfiguration of U.S. bases overseas presents an
opportunity to consider these issues and develop a consciously
sociological approach to military base policy and negotiation. This
Article borrows from social-movements theory to argue that U.S.
officials can use the concept of "political opportunity structure" to
produce better base agreements. Grounded in the notion that the political
context faced by a social movement is a crucial determinant of the
movement's ultimate success or failure, political-opportunity-structure
analysis can be a framework for evaluating a receiving state's
vulnerability to anti-base social movements. U.S. officials who employ
the concept in overseeing the implementation of U.S. forward
deployment strategy will better understand the United States's
Julian Borger, Saudis Draw Their Line in the Sand- Rumsfeld Tries to Talk
Riyadh into Conceding Use ofAir Bases, GUARDIAN, Oct., 4, 2001, at A3.
18 James Brooke, From Military Base to Real Estate Wars, INT'L
HERALD TRIB.,
17

Apr. 26, 2004, at 1.
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negotiating strength in relation to particular countries and produce better
adapted, more durable base agreements.
Part I lays out the relationship between this Article and the
literature on military base agreements, defines political opportunity
structure, and provides context for this Article's particular use of the
concept.
Part II illustrates the explanatory power of politicalopportunity-structure analysis through comparative case studies on antibase movements in Okinawa and the Philippines, arguing that the theory
is largely effective at explaining why the anti-base movement in the
Philippines was successful in the 1980s, and why its counterpart in
Okinawa was unsuccessful in the 1990s. Part III then argues that,
because of the explanatory power suggested in the two case studies, U.S.
policymakers and negotiators should consider using politicalopportunity-structure analysis as a supplemental guide to administering
current base agreements and creating new agreements.
PART I: CONTEXT
A.

The Historical Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base
Agreements
Historically, the United States has underemphasized the
importance of the host nation's domestic political context as one
determinant of a base agreement's long-term viability, and has done very
little to anticipate or appease anti-base movements.
With great
consistency, the United States has instead leveraged its international
power to obtain base agreements that heavily favor U.S. interests over
those of receiving states.' 9
This tendency emerged at least as early as the 1940s. Before the
end of World War II, the doctrine of the "law of the flag" operated as the
basis for most military base agreements, including those that involved
the United States. 20 According to this doctrine, a sending state should
exercise complete and exclusive jurisdiction over its forces stationed

'9 See, e.g., SERGE LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT

INTERNATIONAL
LAW 28 (1971).
20

See id. at 19-21.
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overseas. This approach was supported by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, and justified as a practical matter by
the fact that most bases only existed during wartime-a condition that
made it tactically important for the visiting military to retain exclusive
control over its personnel. Supporters also justified the law of the flag
on the ground that a foreign force typically lacked any connection to the
local population of its receiving state, since civilians were in most cases
evacuated from conflict zones in order to limit casualties. Receiving
states for these types of bases had less leverage to demand jurisdiction,
and sending states such as the United States had fewer reasons to grant it.
Soon after World War II, however, foreign military bases started
to serve new purposes that made them more burdensome to receiving
states. No longer were they temporary posts whose utility was limited to
the duration of a hot war. The growing number of U.S. installations
overseas increasingly functioned during peacetime to promote U.S.
power and thwart the spread of communism. 2 4 Cold War containment
policies called for relatively permanent facilities whose principal values
were deterrent and symbolic. 5 Moreover, many new bases were located
in dense urban areas, causing greater tension between U.S. military
personnel and local citizens, and generating a greater perception of
foreign intrusion. For these reasons, new receiving states demanded
greater recognition of their interests, including expanded jurisdiction
over U.S. personnel.
21

See, e.g., Manuel E. F. Supervielle, The Legal Status of Foreign Military

Personnel in the United States, ARMY LAW. 3, 5-6 (May 1994) (explaining the

meaning and historical development of the law of the flag).
22 Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 138-39 (1812).
23

See, e.g., HARKAVY, supra note 3, at 88 ("The fluidity of diplomatic alliances

[prior to World War II], and the relative absence of an ideological basis for
those alignments, resulted in a dearth of long-term, sustained security
arrangements . . . comparable to those of the later NATO and Warsaw Pacts

alliances. Concomitantly, there were few instances of permanent 'forward'
garrisoning in preparation for war or the reciprocal allied use of basing
facilities.").
24 While the United States had only ten overseas bases at the start of World War
11, it had over sixty-five by 1957. See GEORGE STAMBUK, AMERICAN MILITARY
FORCES
ABROAD: THEIR IMPACT ON THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM 48 (1963).
25
5See HARKAVY, supra note 3, at 50.
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Although the Cold War generation of receiving states often held
greater legal authority over U.S. forces than their pre-war counterparts,
the law of the flag was still the ideal for most U.S. policymakers. It was
a "dogma (that was to] be imposed whenever possible,, 2 6 and it enjoyed
the support of both constitutionalists concerned with the rights of U.S.
military personnel and isolationists hesitant to subject U.S. citizens to
any degree of foreign control .27 For these reasons, the "United States...
tried to obtain a right of exclusive jurisdiction" in "every single
negotiation on the status of its forces" throughout at least the first two
decades following World War 11.28 Unless U.S. negotiators knew that
receiving states were immune to the pressure of anti-base social
movements (an unlikely scenario) this approach necessarily disregarded
the influence of social forces on the long-term viability of base
agreements.
When viewed as part of a general effort to obtain agreements
that substantially favor U.S. interests over those of the host, the United
States's historical preference for universal application of the law of the
flag still manifests itself today. The overwhelming majority of status of
forces agreements (SOFAs) to which the United States is a party are nonreciprocal, meaning that they allow the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over U.S troops stationed on the territory of another stateparty while, at the same time, denying that state-party similar powers
with respect to its own personnel stationed in the United States.29 Many
SOFAs leave only severely limited prosecutorial powers to the host
government for criminal cases involving U.S. suspects.30 Even when the
26 LAZAREFF,

supra note 19, at 28.

27 See STAMBUK, supra note 24, at 49 (explaining that some U.S. politicians

protested NATO SOFA provisions allowing limited jurisdiction over U.S.
military personnel to NATO members for "depriving American servicemen of
their constitutional rights").
28 LAZAREFF, supra note 19, at 19.
29 Steven G. Hemmert, Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAs: US. Interests in
CriminalJurisdiction,B.U. INT'L L.J. 215, 226-27 (1999).
30 Jaime M. Gher, Status of Forces Agreements: Tools to Further Effective

Foreign Policy and Lessons To Be Learned From the United States-Japan
Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 227, 239 (2002) (describing how Art.XVII §5(c)

of the U.S.-Japan SOFA prevents Japan from taking custody of U.S. suspects
before they have been indicted); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Criminal Jurisdiction
Under the US.-Korea Status of Forces Agreement: Problems to Proposals, 13 J.
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terms of a base agreement provide for such powers, the United States
31
usually persuades receiving states to waive their jurisdiction.
Moreover, U.S. promises to reduce the burden of its military presence are
not always fulfilled.3 2
The problem with this approach is not necessarily that U.S.
policymakers seek to draft base agreements that promote U.S. interests.
It is instead that negotiations are often conducted without sufficient
sensitivity to the political context of the receiving state, resulting in base
agreements that actually fail to promote U.S. interests because they
overestimate U.S. bargaining power and are, in the long run, politically
untenable for the host. The status quo approach, still influenced by an
historical preference for the law of the flag, will likely present the United
States with new situations where bases must be removed entirely or
where operational freedom must be significantly restricted due to antiAmerican sentiment. These situations will be repeats of the problems
that occurred in the Philippines in 1991, Saudi Arabia in 2001, and, most
recently, South Korea. Such complications are uniquely likely if the
United States overlooks the interrelationship between the terms of its
agreements and the social forces operating in host states.

L. & POL'Y 213, 218 (2003) (noting that the U.S.-South Korea
SOFA leaves South Korea with "little power to prosecute U.S. soldiers except in
dire situations"); cf Police GrantedMore Access to U.S. Troops, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2004 (reporting that a new agreement allows Japanese authorities
to request custody prior to indictment for cases involving "murder, rape and
other specific instances").
31 The United States has historically obtained jurisdiction waivers in roughly
ninety percent of all cases where the receiving state should have primary
jurisdiction according to the terms of the base agreement. JOHN WOODLIFFE,
TRANSNAT'L

THE PEACETIME USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS UNDER MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 (1992).
32 See, e.g., U.S. Seeks Alternative to Military Base Move, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,

Mar. 25, 2004 (noting that the Special Action Committee on Okinawa's (SACO)
January 1, 2004 deadline for returning the land currently used for Futenma Air
Base passed without any progress).
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The Need for a Sociological Approach to Military Base
Policy and Agreements
For the most part, the literature on status-of-forces agreements
and military base policy has focused on the strategic 33 and legal
Sociological and domestic
complexities of forward deployment. 34
political issues are recognized in the literature, but receive very little indepth treatment. It is therefore unsurprising that most of the reform
proposals for ailing military base agreements also fail to address these
issues. When a base-related problem arises, the knee-jerk reaction
among commentators is to explain either where the United States should
move its facilities, or how to amend the agreement at issue. Several
years ago, for example, after two U.S. marines raped a fourteen-year old
Okinawan girl, public outcry generated two types of discussions about
U.S. military bases in Japan. One discussion centered on whether the
bases were strategically necessary in the first place, especially given the
end of the Cold War.3 5 The other discussion focused on how to make the
U.S.-Japan SOFA more palatable to Okinawan citizens. 36 U.S. officials
primarily engaged in the latter, although they have consistently preferred
B.

33 See, e.g.,

HARKAVY, supra note 3, at 11 (aiming to enhance our
"understanding of the broader contours of contemporary strategy and the longrange evolvement of the major powers' global power balance").
34 See, e.g., LAZAREFF, supra note 19, at 28 (noting that status of forces
agreements "reflect the respective political situations of the States concerned,"
but still devoting the vast majority of his work to a purely legal analysis of the
NATO SOFA); WOODLIFFE, supra note 31, at 77 (mentioning how "experience
demonstrates that, independent of legal argument, the maintenance of foreign
military bases in the territory of another state that is contrary to the expressed
will of that state is, in the long run, politically untenable," but similarly focusing
primarily
on legal issues).
5

See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES

OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 40-41 (2004) (arguing that the United States had to invent
new threats to Japan after the rape incident in order to justify the continued postCold
War presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa).
36
See, e.g., Adam B. Norman, The Rape Controversy:Is a Revision of the Status
of Forces Agreement With Japan Necessary?, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
717, 738 (1996) (discussing potential legal reforms to the U.S.-Japan SOFA).

2006)

MILITARY BASE AGREEMENTS

changes
to the administration of the SOFA over changes to the SOFA
37
text.

The tendency to focus on purely strategic or legal reforms has
also appeared in U.S. dealings with its bases in South Korea. 38 When
U.S. soldiers caused a gruesome traffic accident leading to massive antiAmerican protests in 2002, 39 the discussion was again largely two-sided:
some advocated removing or repositioning U.S. forces on the peninsula,
while others proposed changing the SOFA.40
For several reasons, an exclusively strategic or legal approach to
solving base-related controversies is problematic. First, complete force
withdrawal or repositioning may undermine vital national interests of
both the United States and the host government. Despite their potential
unpopularity, U.S. bases overseas are essential to a large number of
national security goals, and there are often very few alternatives to the
existing locations. Withdrawing from current locations would threaten
the ability of the United States to maintain military alliances, gather
intelligence, and operate as a balancer in conflict regions. Second, ad
hoc SOFA amendments tend to be ineffective, since they are usually
proposed only after a problem has generated extensive public outcry,
tarnished the image of the United States, and threatened the long-term
viability of the U.S. military presence in the given host country. Third,
neither approach is likely to make the U.S. presence sustainable in the
long term, since a host nation's tolerance for U.S. forces is, at its core,
See, e.g., SACO Final Report (Dec. 2, 1996), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96sacol.html
(listing a
37

variety of objectives for reducing the burden imposed by U.S. forces in
Okinawa); Japanese Officials Say Envoy Hinted US. Not to Consider Forces
PactRevision, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., July 1, 2003.

See, e.g., Lee, supra note 30, at 244-48 (advocating four legal reforms to the
U.S.-South Korea SOFA).
38

'9 Don Kirk, 2nd US. Sergeant is Clearedin the Death of2 Korean Girls, N.Y.
TIMES,

Nov. 23, 2002, at A8.

4, See, e.g., John Burton, Fears Grow Over Widening Rift Between Seoul and
US, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at 4 ("There is increasing talk in both countries

that the US might decide to pull out or reduce its military presence in South
Korea out of anger over growing hostility towards the 37,000 US troops
stationed in the country."); cf What Lies Under the SOFA?, KOREA TIMES, May
7, 2003 (explaining that "demands for... SOFA revision from NGOs and other
groups heat up whenever.. . an incident is politicized").

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

(VOL. 14:1

not a legal issue or a matter of base location-it is a social issue. By
treating forward deployment as little more than a question of geopolitics
and international law, we risk both changing base agreements when
change is unnecessary and underestimating the need for change when it
actually is necessary.
A sociological supplement to the strategic and legal agreementreform proposals would help to avoid these problems. Most importantly,
it would enrich the often-incomplete analyses on military base
agreements to create a more complete view of the issues that affect
forward deployment. It would provide a fresh look at the United States's
historical approach to military base agreements. Further, much of the
available scholarship appears to concede that desired strategic and legal
reforms will only succeed if underlying social forces cooperate. In this
sense, a sociological perspective addresses base-agreement reform at a
deeper level. A sociological supplement to the current scholarship could
therefore facilitate solutions to the more fundamental difficulties that
arise in establishing an effective forward deployment strategy.
PART Ill: USING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE TO EXPLAIN
ANTI-BASE MOVEMENT OUTCOMES
A.

Political Opportunity Structure: Background and Theory
The concept of political opportunity structure is not new.

Scholars as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville have employed variations
of it in their attempts to explain social mobilization. Peter Eisinger
formally introduced the concept in the 1970s. 41

Shortly thereafter, the

concept became an important component of studies employing the
"political process" model of social movements-a model emphasizing
that movement success is in part dependent upon the opportunities
afforded insurgents by the shifting institutional structure and ideological
disposition of those in power.42

The fundamental claim of political-

opportunity-structure analysis is that the configuration of regime
characteristics within a country largely determines whether social
movements that interact with the regime will succeed. Traits that
41 See generally Peter K. Eisinger, The Conditions of Protest Behavior in

American Cities, 67 AM. POL. So. REV. 11, 11-13 (1973).

42 See COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (DOUG MCADAM

et al. eds., 1996).

2006]

MILITARY BASE AGREEMENTS

13

enhance a regime's accessibility to its citizens, for example, will help
movements to achieve their aims, The concept competes with rational
choice and cultural models of social change by emphasizing the
importance of largely uncontrollable, external determinants of movement
success. It shows how organizational resources 43 or psychological
strains among citizens, by themselves, cannot fully explain movement
outcomes. 4 Scholars have used the concept to explain events ranging
from anti-nuclear movements in Europe to riots in the United States.
While recognizing that the definition of political opportunity
structure varies widely in the literature, this Article measures political
opportunity structure according to three variables: (1) the relative
openness or closure of a country's political system, (2) the level of
fragmentation among the country's political elite, and (3) the presence or
absence of elite allies to the given social movement. 45 Applications of
41One

prominent theory for explaining varying social movement outcomes
states that the social resources, including financial and networking resources,
availabe to mobilizing groups largely determines whether those groups will
achieve their aims. See John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource
Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212
(1977).

So-called "classical" theories emphasize the importance of psychological
factors in the formation and outcome of social movements. Relative deprivation
theory, for example, states that movements will tend to coalesce when there is a
44

psychological strain, defined as a gap between reality and citizen expectations.
See, e.g., James C. Davies, Towards a Theory of Revolution, 27 AM. SOC. REV.
5, 5 (1962) ("Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of
objective economic and social development is followed by a period of sharp
reversal. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort will
be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary").

45 See, e.g., DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

BLACK INSURGENCY 39 (1982) (depicting political opportunity structure as a set
of "environmental constraints" that fluctuate over time to increase or decrease
the leverage of political protest groups); SIDNEY TARROw, POWER IN
MOVEMENT: SOCIAL CHANGE AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 76-77 (1998)
(defining it as the "dimensions of the political environment that provide
incentives for people to undertake collective actions by affecting their
expectations for success or failure"); Charles D. Brockett, The Structure of
PoliticalOpportunities and PeasantMobilization in Central America, 23 COMP.
POL. 253, 254 (1991) (defining it as "the configuration of forces in a (potential
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the political-process model commonly use these criteria.46 The criteria
also reflect significant structural characteristics that should influence the
likelihood of successful social mobilization if the concept of political
opportunity structure is to have any explanatory power.
Based on the above definition, this Part uses comparative case
studies to illustrate how structural conditions relating to the political
system of a host country can facilitate or impede successful social
mobilization against the presence of U.S. military bases. The case
studies evaluate the structure of political opportunities for anti-base
activists in Okinawa during the 1990s, and for their counterparts in the
Philippines during the 1980s.4 7

For each case, the period examined

represents a time when military base politics were uniquely dynamic and
salient. The studies demonstrate the utility of political-opportunitystructure analysis by helping to explain why the anti-base movement in
the Philippines (a country from which U.S. bases have been withdrawn)
or actual) group's political environment that influences the group's assertion of
its political claims").
46 See, e.g., Brockett, supra note 45, at 257-60 (examining the role of movement
allies in addition to elite fragmentation and conflict); Diane E. Davis, Failed
Democratic Reform in Contemporary Mexico: From Social Movements to the
State and Back Again, 26 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 375, 405 (1994) (discussing the

absence of influential opposition parties as a factor that undermines the success
of social movements); Herbert P. Kitschelt, PoliticalOpportunityStructures and
PoliticalProtest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies, 16 BRITISH J.

POL. SC. 57, 62 (1986) (using regime "openness" as one criterion for testing the
explanatory power of political opportunity structure").
47 Important similarities between Okinawa and the Philippines make a
comparative case study particularly useful: (1) Due to their similar locations,
both cases should have been similarly influenced by geopolitical shifts in U.S.
foreign policy. (2) Both cases were devastated during World War II and
received substantial reconstruction assistance from the United States. See
YOSHIDA, supra note 13 at 3-4, 9, 27-29 (describing the destruction in
Okinawa); BERRY, supra note 14, at 1 (describing the destruction in the

Philippines). (3) Both cases have been territories of the United States-the
Philippines from 1898 to 1946 and Okinawa from the close of World War II to
1972. Finally, (4) citizens in both cases have suffered comparable burdens due
to the presence of U.S. forces. The result is that citizens of both Okinawa and
the Philippines have felt a collective mixture of gratitude and antipathy toward
the United States. James A. Gregor, The U.S. Withdrawal From Bases in the
Philippinesand its Consequences, 26 ASIAN OUTLOOK 21 (1991).
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was successful, while its counterpart in Okinawa (an island that
continues to host thousands of U.S. military personnel) failed.4 8 As the
concept would anticipate, a largely favorable political opportunity
structure corresponded with successful mobilization in the Philippines,
while an unfavorable political opportunity structure corresponded with
unsuccessful mobilization in Okinawa.
B.

The Impact of "Regime Openness" on Anti-base Movement
Outcomes
There is considerable disagreement regarding the appropriate
criteria to use in evaluating political opportunity structure, but "regime
openness" has received virtually universal acceptance in the literature.
The choice to use this criterion in assessing political opportunity
structure is based on the concept's general acceptance and logical appeal,
as will be discussed below. This Section explains the hypothesized
impact of regime openness on the outcome of anti-base movements,
describes how to measure regime openness, and applies the openness
criterion to Okinawa and the Philippines to illustrate its explanatory
power.
Social movement scholars consistently argue that regime
openness correlates positively with greater chances for successful
mobilization. 9 Movements that make demands on politically open and
accessible regimes will be more likely to achieve their goals, and, ceteris
paribus, movements operating against closed regimes with inaccessible
institutions will find it relatively difficult to effect change. This
expectation is reasonable because open regimes generally allow access to
the institutionalized political process for both practical and ideological
reasons. Typical democratic governments, for example, may believe that
voting is important, not only because it gives citizens a stake in the status
quo and an incentive to engage in politics peacefully, but also because

41 But see

Thom Shanker, US. and JapanAgree to Strengthen Military Ties,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at Al (explaining how the United States and Japan
recently agreed to reduce the number of U.S. marines on Okinawa by 7,000). A
separate study on political opportunity structure might usefully examine whether
the agreed reduction is a product of a favorable shift in the recent structural
context.
49 See, e.g., Brockett, supra note 45, at 253; Kitschelt, supra note 46, at 57.
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such regimes are committed to the notion that citizen interests should
shape government policy.
1.
Measuring Regime Openness
Herbert Kitschelt has provided a useful approach for
operationalizing the concept of "openness." In his study on anti-nuclear
movements in Western democratic countries, he argued that four factors
primarily determine the degree of regime openness: (1) "the number of
political parties, factions, and groups that effectively articulate . . .
demands in electoral politics;" (2) "the capacity of legislatures to develop
and control policies independently of the executive;" (3) the "pattern of
intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch;" and
(4) the presence of "mechanisms that aggregate [popular] demands. 50
Each of these criteria requires some explanation.
According to Kitschelt, the first component of regime openness
correlates positively with the chances for successful mobilization. The
presence of greater numbers of politically influential parties and factions
makes it more likely that movements will achieve their aims. This is
because, when several effective parties and factions are present, it is
more difficult to "confine electoral interest articulation to the 'cartel' of
entrenched interests that is represented by the established, bureaucratized
parties.",5' Kitschelt's analysis assumes that parties operate to represent
the interests of their constituents and that constituent demands vary by
party, but these are both reasonable assumptions.
The second criterion-the capacity of legislatures to develop and
control policies independently of the executive-also correlates
positively with the likelihood of movement success. A "legislature is by
definition an electorally accountable agent" that is sensitive to popular
demands. In contrast, "only the uppermost positions in the executive are
subject to ... direct public pressure," since bureaucrats are unelected and
often make decisions on technocratic bases that are independent of, and
at times in tension with, popular demands.
Countries with relatively
powerful and independent legislatures are more likely to foster
successful social protest because their legislative branches are less
constrained by the technocratic, non-democratic interests of the
oKitschelt, supra note 46, at 63.

S1 id
52 i
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bureaucracy.
An independent legislature is uniquely capable of
responding to the vox populi.
Kitschelt's "pattern of intermediation" criterion qualifies his
argument about executive insensitivity to popular pressure. Referring to
the relationship between the executive branch and private interest groups,
he argues that "where 'pluralist' and fluid links are dominant, access for
new interests to the [centers] of political decision-making is
facilitated. 5 3 Being able to articulate concerns directly to influential
officials bestows a degree of legitimacy on activists' demands and helps
to ensure that critical viewpoints are thoughtfully considered. Executive
authority that grants this type of access to a variety of groups will
increase the range of opportunities for reform. Inversely, regimes
characterized by limited access will marginalize some interest groups by
omitting their policy preferences from the political decision calculus.
Finally, Kitschelt argues that "political openness not only
requires opportunities for the articulation of new demands, but new
demands must actually find their way into the processes of forming
policy compromises and consensus. '54 If this is to occur, there must be
"mechanisms that aggregate demands."" Successful mobilization, in
other words, requires that protesters have access to tools for organizing
and focusing general discontent toward the achievement of specific
social goals. These tools include lobbyists, media outlets, and courts,
among others.
2.
Regime Openness in Okinawa
The characteristics of both local and national Japanese
government affected the level of regime openness in Okinawa during the
1990s. Anti-base activists in Okinawa Prefecture had to influence the
formal political process in the Prefecture, and eventually the central
government in Tokyo. This reality stemmed from the nature of military
Intimately related to issues such as defense and
base policy.
international relations, the U.S. military presence was necessarily a
national political issue that required reform proposals to obtain
cooperation from both local and national government. Local-level
cooperation was important because base policy most directly affected
53Id.
5
4id
55 Id.
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citizens of the prefecture, and because access to local political bodies
could help empower citizen demands on the central government. On the
other hand, the cooperation of the central government was vital; only
Tokyo could negotiate with the United States on base policy, and local
officials held virtually no authority over the central government on
matters of defense.
a.
The Number of Effective PoliticalParties
On a national level, Japan would seem to satisfy easily
Kitschelt's first criterion for openness, as there were numerous political
parties, many of which contained several factions. In the past twenty
years, for example, the following parties all held seats in the Japanese
parliament: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Renewal Party, the
New Party Harbinger, the Japan New Party, the Japanese Socialist Party
(JSP), the Clean Government Party (CGP), the Democratic Socialist
Party (DSP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and several others. 5"
The Liberal Democratic Party alone contained approximately five
factions.57
The Japanese government seems far more open than many others
when considering these factors superficially. However, simply counting
the number of parties and factions in order to determine regime openness
is likely to yield misleading conclusions. Kitschelt's criterion requires
not only that there be a multiplicity of parties and factions in parliament,
but also that these groups effectively articulate their policy preferences.
Politically powerless parties and factions cannot increase the likelihood
of movement success because they have no influence with which to
encourage reform.
Assessing the influence of Japanese opposition parties makes it
clear that the regime was relatively inaccessible for the anti-base
movement in terms of this first metric. Numerous scholars have argued
that opposition parties in Japan have been weak, and a quick glance at
The LDP-Japan's most
history seems to validate their claim.
influential political party-has held on to power for all but eleven

56 RAY CHRISTENSEN, ENDING THE

LDP

HEGEMONY: PARTY COOPERATION IN

JAPAN 14 (2000).
7
GERALD L. CURTIS, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLITICS 82

(1988).
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months from 1955 to the present.5' During this reign, opposition parties
have tenaciously struggled to wrest control from the LDP, but they have
largely failed.
There are several explanations for the LDP's dominance and the
opposition's weakness-some relating to political skill, others to
organizational incentives and coalition dynamics. 59 Considerable debate
has occurred over the merits of these explanations, but, for us, the reason
for LDP dominance is not of particular concern. What matters most is
that there seems to be unanimous agreement that the LDP does dominate.
All agree that opposition parties have been far less influential than the
LDP-a party that has consistently supported the status quo on base
policy. 60 In terms of political opportunity structure, this translated into a
fairly closed system during the 1990s. LDP dominance meant that policy
change was unlikely even when opposition parties supported the antibase movement.
Opposition parties were specifically powerless when it came to
shaping military base policy. The year 1994 provides a particularly
illustrative example. At that time, Japan's opposition parties had
achieved a major victory by electing as prime minister a socialist
58 See David Pilling, Japan Inches Toward Meaningful Democracy: The LDP

Will Win, Again, But the PoliticalGround is Shifting, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2003,
at 7.
59 See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 56 (arguing generally that coalition
dynamics have limited the opposition's ability to gain power); CURTIS, supra
note 57, at 45 (arguing that the "LDP's success in retaining power owes a great
deal to its ability to closely track changes in its social and economic
environment and to adjust its policies accordingly"); see also J. A. A.
STOCKWIN, JAPAN: DIVIDED POLITICS IN A GROWTH ECONOMY 173-82 (1982)
(contending that the consistency of LDP dominance has demoralized opposition
parties, causing them to engage in irresponsible ideological and political attacks
instead of constructive criticism that could undermine popular support for the
LDP).
60 JOSEPH GERSON & BRUCE BIRCHARD, THE SUN NEVER SETS: CONFRONTING
THE NETWORK OF U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES 188 (1991). There is some

indication, however, that the LDP is also becoming more sympathetic toward
anti-base movement demands. See, e.g., Takeshi Ando, LDP Members Aim to
Repair SOFA, NIKKEI WEEKLY, June 30, 2003 (noting that voter concern over
U.S. military activities in Japan has caused some LDP lawmakers to seek
revision of the U.S.-Japan SOFA).
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candidate named Murayama Tomiichi. Murayama was the first non-LDP
prime minister in decades. Yet, even with a non-LDP politician
occupying Japan's highest political office, the national government failed
to offer any concessions to the anti-base movement in a major dispute
with Okinawa's then-governor, Ota Masahide. Governor Ota had been
protesting the land-lease agreements for U.S. bases in Okinawa by
refusing to provide proxy signatures for the lease documents of
landowners who refused to hand their property over to the United States.
Despite being a staunch opponent of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,
Murayama initiated legal action against Ota to sign the documents in his
place. The result was an extension of some of the land leases that
allowed U.S. bases to remain in the prefecture and a major defeat for the
anti-base movement. It appeared that Murayama and his party affiliates
abandoned their preferences on base policy once they made it into
office. 61 Although a variety of factors may have contributed to this
outcome, one appeared to be the lingering influence of the LDP.
Murayama was only able to become prime minister by obtaining LDP
support in parliament. In return for this support, the LDP may have
required close socialist adherence to LDP policy positions, including the
LDP's support for U.S. bases.
In part, the presence of numerous opposition parties in Japan did
not enhance regime openness because the parties lacked influence. Even
to the extent that these parties had influence, however, there is little
evidence that they exercised it in favor of base removal. The Japanese
Communist Party was the only consistent supporter of anti-base activists,
and the example of the Murayama government shows that even parties
agreeing ideologically with the anti-base movement were willing to
withhold their support in exchange for political power. 62 That opposition
party support was so lukewarm stemmed in part from the perception that
the removal of bases from Okinawa would simply require more bases on
the mainland-a decidedly unwelcome outcome among the majority of

61 See Etsujiro Miyagi, Redressing the Okinawa Base Problem, JAPAN Q., Jan.-

Mar. 1996, at 30.
62 Daniel B. Schirmer, Sexual Abuse and the U.S. Military Presence: The
Philippines and Japan, MONTHLY REV., Feb. 1997, at 55 (explaining that the
Japanese Communist Party consistently opposed the presence of U.S. bases and
supported anti-base activists).
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the Japanese public. 63 More fundamentally, however, the weakness of
opposition party support stemmed from a general lack of concern for
base removal among Japanese citizens. Okinawa is geographically and
culturally distant from the rest of Japan, and these factors made it
difficult for anti-base sentiment to spread nationally. 64
As one
commentator explained, "the physical distance of the U.S. military from
the densely populated urban centers in Japan ensured that the U.S.
military presence remained on the periphery of the public
consciousness., 65 Many citizens of mainland Japan were happy as long
as they did not hear American jets flying overhead or pass military
installations on the way to work. A political party of any stripe has little
incentive to demand base removal from Okinawa when the majority of
its constituents are apathetic toward the issue.
The nature of LDP factions also seems to indicate that the
Japanese parliament was not a particularly useful forum for achieving
reform on the base issue. Not only had the number of factions decreased
over preceding decades; these factions did not represent a variety of
policy perspectives. As Gerald Curtis explains, "From the beginning, the
role of LDP factions [has been] to decide who the party's leaders would
be, not what their policies should be.... Factions as such do not take
positions on policy issues, nor do they exhibit any ideological
coherence. ' ,66 For anti-base activists, this condition should have made it
harder to obtain LDP support, since ideological incoherence would
complicate the task of identifying potentially supportive factions and
stymie the organization of LDP members who might oppose the base
presence.
In contrast to national government, local government in Japan
during the 1990s was quite accessible for anti-base activists in Okinawa.
Political opposition parties have historically been more successful in
Okinawa than in any other prefecture, and the local government has a

US. Bases: Once the Only Issue; A/ow Only One of Many in Tough Economic
Climate, ASAHI SHIMBUN, May 15, 2002.
64 Interview with Koji Arakaki, Director of the Democratic Socialist Party's
Okinawa Headquarters, Naha, Okinawa (Mar. 26, 2001).
65
63

66

SHEILA SMITH, LOCAL VOICES, NATIONAL ISSUES
CURTIS, supra note 57, at 88.

83 (2000).
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record of relative sensitivity toward anti-base sentiment. 67
In
cooperation with prefectural authorities, base opponents were able to
conduct several referenda, organize broad opposition to the U.S. military
presence, and consistently press Tokyo for policy changes. Following
the rape of a young Okinawan girl by two U.S. Marines in 1995, for
example, "all major political parties in Okinawa" attended one of the
largest and most widely supported anti-base demonstrations in the
prefecture's history.68 Even the Okinawa LDP Chairman expressed his
approval of the event, stating that the rally was an example of "nonpartisan politics-we
were united in our calls for addressing the Okinawa
69
Problem.,
The Okinawan Prefectural Assembly's approval of a referendum
on base policy in June 1996 is another example of local legislative
sensitivity to movement demands. Assembly members "worked in
cooperation with . . . villages, towns, and cities, as well as various
citizens groups, to promote the referendum." 7 ° These actions signified a
uniquely high degree of openness on the prefectural level, since the
government's actions were ostensibly to address citizen demands and
send a strong message of discontent to Tokyo. Significantly, while the
local LDP staunchly opposed the referendum, it failed to block the
prefectural assembly from passing a referendum ordinance, showing that
the LDP's nearly hegemonic role in the
national parliament did not
71
guarantee influence in Okinawan politics.
In summary, regime openness for anti-base activists in Japan
during the 1990s appears mixed under Kitschelt's first criterion. A
combination of LDP dominance, low numbers of policy-oriented factions
within parties, and weak public support for base removal outside of
Okinawa limited the ability of opposition parties to support the anti-base
Shinichiro Kumagai, Can the Unified Lines of Battle in Okinawa Be
ZNET
(Oct.
14,
2004),
at
=
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionlD 17&ltemID=6420
(explaining how political opposition parties have had more success in Okinawa
Prefecture
than in any other).
68
Robert D. Eldridge, The 1996 Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions, 37 ASIAN
SURVEY 879, 883 (1997).
67

Extended?,

69

Id.

70 Id. at
71

892.
Id. at 894.
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movement within the national parliament. At the same time, opposition
parties contributed substantially to the anti-base movement in Okinawa's
local politics. Although the centrality of national policymaking on the
base issue seems to limit severely the relevance of local political
successes within Okinawa, those successes provided some evidence that
anti-base activists did not face an entirely closed regime.
b.
Legislative Independence
Regime openness also appears somewhat mixed when
considering Kitschelt's second criterion for openness, or the level of
legislative independence from the executive.
While the Japanese
constitution outlines unique powers for each branch of Japanese
government, the national parliament does not operate entirely
independent of executive control or influence. Four observations support
this conclusion. First, Japan has a parliamentary system of government
that to some degree fuses executive and legislative authority, and stresses
the cohesion-not independence--of government branches. The prime
minister, for example, is elected directly by members of the parliament,
and the cabinet often consists of former parliamentarians. Second,
throughout Japan's postwar history, a significant number of parliament
members have been ex-bureaucrats who, because of their prior
professional experiences, have often acted with bureaucratic perspectives
and interests in mind.72 Third, the Japanese bureaucracy exerts direct
influence over the parliament by developing a significant portion of the
bills sent to the Japanese parliament, or "Diet." Reflecting this reality,
Chalmers Johnson has contended that the Diet merely offers a "rubber
stamp of approval" to policies generated by the bureaucracy. 73 Most
believe the bureaucracy to be more competent than Diet members in its
ability to generate policy, and the participation of bureaucrats in the
lawmaking process enables them, as non-elected officials, partially to
shape law independent of public demand. Fourth, the bureaucracy
hamstrung the legislature's independence by administering aid and
development assistance to Okinawa. "[H]uge government expenditure in
roads, public buildings, parks, social security and education... [acted as
a] 'carrot' to win people's support or acquiescence to the military
72

See

CHALMERS JOHNSON,

OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY,
73
1d.

at 47.

MITI

AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH

1925-1975, at 45-50 (1982).
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burden. 1 4 This assistance limited popular support among Okinawans for
the removal of U.S. bases and gave Diet members and other politicians
less reason to cooperate with the anti-base movement. Governor Ota's
loss to Inamine Keiichi in the Okinawa gubernatorial election of
November 1998 illustrates the problem. Commentators have widely
75
attributed Ota's loss to his overzealous support for anti-base activists.
Okinawans voted against him, many contend, out of fear that base
removal would exacerbate the island's economic problems by
threatening the flow of development assistance from Tokyo. 76
c.
Pluralism
Kitschelt's third criterion is pluralist access to the executive. If
Japan exhibited a high level of regime openness under this criterion,
social movements and private political organizations should have been
able to influence directly Japanese bureaucrats. As Muramatsu & Krauss
have shown, however, this has not always been the case. 7 During the
1990s, Japanese pluralism was in fact "patterned" in the sense that many
of the relationships between government and private interest groups were
institutionalized and lacked fluidity. There existed a seemingly fixed
alliance of mutual support and protection between industry, the
bureaucracy, and conservative parties, and this alliance made it more
difficult for non-institutional, excluded interest groups
such as the anti78
base movement to participate effectively in politics.
Pluralism appears even more limited if one considers local
government as a type of interest group in Japanese politics-a notion
particularly fitting in the case of Okinawa. Japan's relatively centralized
form of government functioned to limit the prefectures' and
14 YOSHIDA, supra note 13, at 169.

75 See, e.g., JPRI Staff, The LDP Takes Over in Okinawa, 5 JPRI CRITIQUE

(Dec. 1998), at http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique_VI

2-4

.html.

76 Julia Yonetani, Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater, 33
CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 70, 78 (2001).

'" See generally Michio Muramatsu & Ellis S. Krauss, The ConservativePolicy
Line and the Development of PatternedPluralism, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF JAPAN:

THE DOMESTIC

TRANSFORMATION

516

(Kozo

Yamamura

&

Yasukichi Yasuba eds., 1987) (discussing the concept and history of patterned
luralism and its effect on the accessibility of Japanese executive officials).
JOHNSON, supra note 73, at 50.
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municipalities' power to exert influence on matters of national
importance.
Japanese "central ministries have broad authority to
interpret the law in the absence of court decisions, and they guard their
authority jealously .... Local policymaking is . . . granted much less
legitimacy than central policymaking." 79 This was especially true in the
case of the Okinawan base issue,8 Central authorities had a unique
tendency to monopolize decision-making on matters of defense and
international relations. This tendency gave local Okinawan authorities,
as well as the activists they represented, little room to shape policy.
The hierarchy of central over local authority also extended to
political parties. LDP party headquarters in Tokyo rarely addressed the
concerns of their local officers in deliberations over base policy. 8' Even
when the anti-base movement was able to influence local party offices,
national party officials appeared to show little concern. This and the
other factors mentioned above limited regime openness under Kitschelt's
third criterion during the 1990s.
d

Availability of Demand-Aggregation
Mechanisms
Okinawans who opposed the U.S. base presence did not face a
particularly open regime in terms of Kitschelt's fourth criterion-the
availability of mechanisms for aggregating political demands. On a local
level, Okinawans were able to participate in referenda on the base issue,
and the Communist Party consistently expressed their concerns to the
central government, but Okinawans did not otherwise see success.
One reason for the lack of success was that nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) found it
extremely difficult to operate effectively in Japan. Until 1998, when the
Diet passed a new NPO law, Japanese Civil Code placed a number of
onerous requirements on their activities:

79 STEPHEN REED, JAPANESE PREFECTURES AND POLICYMAKING 25

(1986); see

also Ota Masahide, Beyond Hondo: Devolution and Okinawa, in JAPAN &
OKINAWA: STRUCTURE & SUBJECTIVITY 114 (Glenn D. Hook & Richard Siddle

eds., 2003).
80 SMITH, supranote 65, at 80.
81 Interview with Hiroshi Nakamatsu, Executive Director of the Liberal
Democratic Party's Okinawa Headquarters, in Naha, Okinawa (Mar. 27, 2002).
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The Civil Code .. . left it up to bureaucrats to determine
whether a particular organization was in fact
contributing to the public interest . . . . Thus, the
competent authorities possess[ed] discretionary authority
to approve or reject applications for incorporated status
without regard to objective criteria. Moreover . .
government agencies . . . require[d] applicants . . . to
have a minimum of approximately 300 million yen as an
endowment . . . . This situation . . . resulted in a
pervasive pattern of bureaucratic control over publicinterest corporations. 82
Faced with daunting obstacles to incorporation, many NPOs and
NGOs chose to operate without incorporated status. This forced choice,3
however, "deprive[d] ... organization[s] of social status" and efficacy.8
Non-incorporated organizations found it more difficult to mobilize
effectively citizens' support for their cause and nearly impossible to
influence government policy. Lacking formal organizational features
and legal recognition, the strength of Okinawa's protest movement
fluctuated with the occurrence of base-related injustices. Concerned
citizens had a hard time carrying out sustained campaigns of opposition
to the base presence because they usually participated in purely informal
organizations that lacked clear leadership and decision-making
hierarchies. These citizens, moreover, lacked resources and typically had
to canvas for support as individuals, rather than as members of a formal
organization with a clear purpose. The Diet's 1998 NPO law loosened
some requirements for incorporation, but burdensome hurdles
remained. 4
The fact that most political parties did not typically seek
cooperation from NGOs and NPOs on base policy also limited the role of
82

Tadashi Yamamoto, Emergence of Japan's Civil Society and Its Future

Challenges, in DECIDING THE PUBLIC GOOD: GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

INJAPAN 108 (Tadashi Yamamoto ed., 1999).

" Id. at 109.
84 See id. at 119-22 (noting that weak tax incentives for contributions to
nonprofit organizations, in addition to the Japanese Constitution's Article 89
proscription on government financial support of NGOs, made it difficult for
NGOs to obtain resources and exert influence).
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Okinawan citizen organizations in the politics relating to the base
presence,8 5 Kinjo Tsutomu, a representative for the Clean Government
Party (CGP) in the Okinawa Assembly, explained that only left-leaning
parties such as the Japanese Communist Party actively sought NGO
input.8 6 Other parties could rely on what he perceived to be more
qualified sources of analysis and support: bureaucrats and partyaffiliated think tanks. This view, shared by other local officials,
sidelined NGOs in the development of base reform proposals.8 7
Courts, another common mechanism for aggregating citizen
demands, also failed to contribute substantially to regime openness
during the 1990s. Frank Upham has explained that one of the most
significant functions of the Japanese legal system is simply to bring
attention to important social issues.88 Legal action on base-related
problems may have accomplished little else. Parties that use Japanese
courts have historically had to endure slow proceedings and extremely
crowded dockets. 89
Japanese courts have little control over
administrative agencies and the Prime Minister, and they are often
incapable of providing adequate relief in citizen suits against the
government. 90 In addition, as Ramseyer & Rasmusen have shown,
Japanese judges manifest a consistently conservative bias in cases that

85

For further discussion on the anemic state of Japanese civil society, see also

ROBERT J. PEKKANEN, JAPAN'S DUAL CIVIL SOCIETY: MEMBERS WITHOUT

(Apr. 2003) (Ph.D. dissertation, at abstract, Harvard University)
(explaining that "Japan's under-professionalized civil society organizations are
ill equipped to engage in public policy debates, monitor state action, or influence
Vublic opinion or the media").
Interview with Kinjo Tsutomu, Representative in the Okinawa Prefectural
Assembly, in Naha, Okinawa (Mar. 27, 2002).
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87 See JENNIFER CHAN-TIBERGHIEN, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS POLITICS IN

136 (2005) (observing "the inability of Japanese NGOs to obtain political
support" for Okinawan interests).
88 FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 216 (1987).
89 John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigator, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD.
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five years, but proceedings that continue for eight to ten years are not
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involve politically divisive issues. 91 This observation seems particularly
true for cases that have dealt with the legality of the U.S. military
presence. Concerned with institutional capital and legitimacy, the
Japanese judicial system has seemed reluctant to involve itself in
politically charged issues of national security and foreign policy.
Japanese courts have thus ruled against anti-base parties in several
important cases.92

At the same time, attracting public attention to an issue is
probably a prerequisite to the aggregation of citizen demands. If
Upham's description of the role of Japanese courts is correct, those
courts may have contributed to regime openness simply by hearing baserelated cases and in doing so raising public awareness about the base
issue. Moreover, there is some evidence suggesting that Japanese courts
have been an effective avenue for incremental progress on the base
problem. In 2002, for example, the Yokohama District Court ordered the
Japanese government to pay several billion yen in total compensation to
thousands of residents around the Atsugi military base in Kanagawa
Prefecture. 93 The court ruled that noise pollution levels around the base
were excessive and required government compensation for those living
nearby.94 Judicial support of this nature is a relatively new development,
however, and there is little comparable evidence of support from the
1990s.
In light of the above considerations, Okinawan anti-base activists
encountered a mostly unfavorable level of regime openness under each
of Kitschelt's four criteria. Numerous parties and factions existed in
Japanese politics during the 1990s, but opposition parties that sided with
base opponents were largely powerless; the traditionally conservative
91 J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges so
Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001)

(examining the institutional structure of the Japanese court system and how that
structure influences court decisions in politically charged cases).
92 See, e.g., Okinawan's Claims on US Base Rejected, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 26, 1995, at 12; Okinawans Ask Top Court to Hear Property Rights Suit,
KYODO, Nov. 14, 2002.
93 Government to Pay 2.75 Billion Yen Over Base Noise, KYODO, Oct. 17, 2002.
94 Id. But see UPHAM, supra note 89, at 217 ("[T]he concept of achieving even
incremental social change directly through the legal system ... is largely absent

today in Japan.").
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bureaucracy significantly influenced the Diet; patterned pluralism limited
access to the executive branch for non-traditional political actors; and
mechanisms for aggregating public demands were largely ineffective.
The Article next evaluates regime openness in the Philippines.
3.
Regime Openness in the Philippines
The lease for U.S. bases in the Philippines expired in September
1991, after the Philippine Senate rejected by a narrow 12-11 margin a
proposed treaty to extend U.S. control of the facilities for another ten
years. 9 The Senate's action was historic and led to complete withdrawal
of U.S. forces after nearly a century-long stay. What was surprising
about the eventual base removal was that many American officials and
policy experts had consistently argued for the maintenance of U.S. forces
in the Philippines. Throughout the Cold War and even immediately
thereafter, U.S. bases in the country were widely regarded as invaluable
components of U.S. strategy in East and Southeast Asia, 96 It seems
unlikely that the United States would have given up these strategic assets
entirely on its own accord. If political opportunity structure is an
effective analytical tool, one would expect that there was a high level of
regime openness in the years leading up to 1991 that allowed anti-base
activists in the Philippines to influence government policy against the
presence of U.S. forces. Also, if political opportunity structure has
explanatory power, the level of openness in the Philippines should have
been higher than the level experienced in Japan. The following assesses
the accuracy of these expectations by applying Kitschelt's four criteria
for regime openness to Philippine politics in the decade preceding base
removal.
a.
The Number of Effective PoliticalParties
Philippine electoral politics in the early 1980s were anything but
democratic. In an attempt to shore up the legitimacy of his regime,
Ferdinand Marcos lifted martial law in 1981 and held a national

Charles P. Wallace, Manila Senate Rejects US. Pact, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1991, at Al.

95

96 See, e.g., A. JAMES GREGOR & VIRGILIO AGANON, THE PHILIPPINE BASES:
U.S. SECURITY AT RISK 20 (1987) (describing Clark Air Field and the naval base

at Subic Bay as "the centerpieces of U.S. defensive and deterrent strategy in the
region").
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presidential election. 97 These actions, however, created only a fagade of
democracy because Marcos frequently used force and intimidation in
electoral contests, resulting in the de facto disenfranchisement of his
opponents. He mobilized extensive political, coercive, and monetary
resources to make it nearly impossible for opposition candidates to
succeed. 98 Even more, Marcos retained an ability to create law
independent of the Interim Batasang Pambansa and detain anyone
subversive to his government. 99 Under authoritarian rule, opponents of
Marcos, including anti-base activists, were unable to institutionalize
effective opposition parties.
The ruling party-Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL)---was a Marcos clique that dominated every branch of
the government and held nearly every seat in the Interim Batasang.
Although opposition parties such as Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN), Bicol
Saro, and Pusyon Bisaya did exist, they were "too small and too
negligible to pose any threat" to KBL authority 00 Marcos limited the
size of the institutionalized opposition by depriving many political
parties of national accreditation, thereby allowing most non-KBL
organizations to maintain only regional constituencies. Various election
laws further impeded the effort of regime foes to institutionalize a viable
party-based opposition. o
Faced with guaranteed defeat, opponents of Marcos unanimously
agreed to boycott elections in 1981 ,02 This tactic said a great deal about
electoral politics in the Philippines at the time: democratic activities
were widely viewed as futile because the regime was immune to popular
pressure. In this setting, Kitschelt's criterion for the number of
influential parties and factions seems almost inapplicable. There were no
effective institutionalized opposition parties in Philippine politics in the
RAUL P. DEGUZMAN & MILA A. REFORMA, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN
THE
PHILIPPINES 100 (1988).
98
EVA-LOTTA E. HEDMAN & JOHN T. SIDEL, PHILIPPINE POLITICS AND SOCIETY
97

IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
TRAJECTORIES 19 (2000).

COLONIAL

LEGACIES,

POST-COLONIAL

99 The Interim Batasang Pambansa was the national legislature of the Philippines
from
1973-1981.
100 DEGUZMAN & REFORMA, supra note 98, at 94.
'

JENNIFER CONROY FRANCO, ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE

156 (2001).
PHILIPPINES
2
'O 1d. at 161-63.
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early 1980s. The regime was closed completely, and the anti-base
movement could not influence policy through elections.
As the decade progressed, however, popular forces gradually
broke up the political monopoly of Ferdinand Marcos. Critics of Marcos03
shifted strategies from the "protest boycott" to the "protest vote."'
Conservative opponents of Marcos began to encourage protest through
mass electoral participation, hoping that such an effort would make clear
the illegitimacy of any KBL victories at the polls.1 0 4 With this shift in
strategy, opposition parties were able to obtain nearly one-third of the
contested seats in the 1984 regular Batasang elections. 0 5 Marcos still
controlled the legislature, but the results "convinced most Filipinos as
well as foreign observers that the opposition, rather than the
administration, was the real choice of the electorate."'' 0 6 Many believed
that, absent Marcos's manipulation of election results, opposition
candidates would have gained even more seats than they did)0 7
Yet, the mildly favorable results of the 1984 elections still did
not translate into empowerment for the anti-Marcos/anti-base opposition.
Non-KBL candidates gained more seats than in any other time since the
imposition of martial law, but they could not effectively articulate
demands, as the first Kitschelt criterion requires. KBL hegemony
persisted until 1986, and the legislature was little more than a rubber
stamp for presidential decisions. 10 8 There were still no effective
institutionalized opposition parties.
Corazon Aquino's rise to power, the ouster of President Marcos
and the "People Power Revolution" of February 1986, however,
gradually transformed the regime from dictatorship to fledgling
democracy. The Aquino administration's first year was in some ways
just as undemocratic as its predecessor, as President Aquino quickly
"made herself the most powerful ruler in Philippine history." 09 The new
president issued decree legislation, abolished the National Assembly,
' 3 1d at 172.
Id at 168, 172-73.
0
5
' Id at 170-71.
106 JOHN BRESNAN, CRISIS
141-42 (1986).
104
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0
0

' DEGUZMAN & REFORMA, supranote 98, at 161.
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removed thousands of local elected officials, forced the resignation of
Marcos-era Supreme Court justices, and formed a commission to draft a
new constitution 10° Still without a functional legislative branch, it is
doubtful that the political events of 1986 were themselves a move toward
greater political openness in terms of the first Kitschelt criterion. The
transition, at first, merely replaced the dictatorial, pro-U.S. Marcos
regime with a dictatorial executive composed of old Marcos opponents.
The Philippine government then made a noticeable move toward
openness in 1987 when President Aquino promulgated and the public
Drafters of the 1987
approved by plebiscite a new constitution.
Constitution aimed to open Philippine politics to democratic influences,
and they created safeguards against the potential future emergence of
another authoritarian president by, for example, establishing a clear
separation of powers among the branches of government."' Aquino also
In this
made clear her commitment to free and fair elections.
environment, opposition parties of all types could more easily exert
influence. KBL hegemony ended, and a relatively high number of
12
political parties gained power in the newly convened legislature."
These developments created greater regime openness.
The shift to democracy, however, did not eliminate all barriers to
successful anti-base mobilization. The Philippine case in fact violates a
key assumption behind Kitschelt's argument regarding the effect of
political parties on regime openness-the assumption that diverse parties
represent diverse interests. Unlike those in many other countries,
Philippine political parties did not represent a variety of constituencies.
Some have illustrated the impact of this homogeneity by referring to the
Philippines as an "oligarchic democracy" and explaining that powerful
parties consistently represented the parochial interests of the political and
economic elite, regardless of varying party titles and leadership. 1 3 These
parties primarily operated to organize and maintain patronage networks

10

Id.
DEGUzMAN & REFORMA, supra note 98, at 278-81.
Id.
at 105-10.
13 See ERIC U. GUTIERREZ ET AL., ALL IN THE FAMILY: A STUDY OF ELITES AND
POWER RELATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 7 (1992) (noting the various terms
scholars use to characterize Philippine democracy).
"'
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that, rather
than promote reform, entrenched the status quo political
11 4
hierarchy.
Thus, even if the Philippines had a significant number of parties
represented in the post-Marcos Batasang, and even if those parties
exerted influence on government policy, the political system may not
have been open to movement demands. Parties that had opposed the
Marcos regime did not necessarily create greater regime openness for the
anti-base movement. Diversity of party ideology substantially affects the
level of political access held by military base opponents, and it was
largely absent in the Philippines.
b.
Legislative Independence
As far as Kitschelt's second criterion is concerned, the Philippine
government was completely inaccessible during the first half of the
1980s. The legislature, as noted above, was merely a puppet of the
Marcos administration, and it was almost entirely dependent on the
executive. The Interim Batasang Pambansa could not independently
elect its own prime minister because the 1973 Constitution explicitly
reserved the post for the incumbent president."' In part because of this
provision, the legislature was bound substantially by executive will.
Corruption and coercion in the Marcos government also made it difficult
16
for elected representatives to use their positions to oppose the regime.
Fortunately for base opponents, the regular Batasang Pambansa,
created in 1984, had broader powers than its predecessor. 1 7 These
included the abilities to impeach the President and propose constitutional
amendments, both of which allowed the legislature to operate with
greater independence, although Marcos ultimately retained a significant
degree of control, 18 Legislative independence from the executive
progressed still further with the overthrow of Marcos in 1986. The 1987
at 165 (pointing out that "party affiliations by... candidates were more a
function of the realignment of clan interests and accessibility of patronage
networks, rather than a function of ideological considerations").
115 PHIL. CONST. (1973) art. XVII, § 3, cl. 1; DEGUZMAN & REFORMA, supra
note 98, at 124.
116See, e.g., BRESNAN, supra note 107, at 82 (explaining how Marcos used
bribery and threats against Senators who protested his actions).
117 DEGUzMAN & REFORMA, supranote 98, at 156.
14Id

118

Id
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Constitution established a bicameral legislature that could independently
elect its leaders, and the legislature held significant new powers to
declare war and make appropriations without excessive executive
interference.' 19 Aquino's effort to institutionalize democracy in the
Philippines also decreased the role of coercion in national politics
and
2
allowed legislators to represent more freely their constituents. 0
These changes suggest that Philippine regime openness in the
decade preceding base removal progressed when measured in terms of
legislative independence. The 1980s opened with the Interim Batasang
Pambansa highly dependent on the executive, but the gradual weakening
and eventual overthrow of the Marcos regime enabled the legislature
increasingly to operate without executive interference. Relative to earlier
eras of Philippine political history, the Aquino government of the late
1980s and early 1990s was open to popular pressure.
Batasang
independence should have allowed the anti-base movement to influence
government policy more successfully than it had before through newly
available access to the legislative branch. On this note, it is significant
that the PhilippineSenate rejected the treaty to renew the leases for U.S.
military bases in 1991-a body that would have been largely dependent
on the political will of Marcos only five years earlier.
c.
Pluralism
Pluralist access to the executive, Kitschelt's third criterion, also
moved toward openness as the 1980s progressed. Influence in the
Marcos government had long been limited to a narrow clique of elite
clients, blood relatives, and high-ranking military leaders) 21 Marcos's
reliance on the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for a variety of
social control and political functions politicized the military and gave it
significant influence in the regime, often to the exclusion of competing
Id at 160.

ZO See id. at 278-80.
121 FRANCO, supra note 102, at 108-09 (explaining how Marcos based his rule

on personal loyalty and gave significant power to the military); GREGOR &
AGANON, supra note 97, at 52 (noting how Marcos created a "Philippine
Zaibatsu" of loyal entrepreneurs to whom he provided business advantages); see
generally RICHARD J. KESSLER,

REBELLION AND REPRESSION IN THE PHILIPPINES

(1989) (discussing among other topics the role of military elites in the Marcos
era).
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institutions. 2 2 Moreover, the regime's extensive domestic intelligence
network reduced local political power.
Marcos used his National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) and the Integrated National
Police (INP) to sabotage local officials who opposed government policy
over issues ranging from land reform to corruption.' 3 By doing so, he
undermined the influence of local government in national
policymaking.1 24 All of these factors served to limit severely pluralism
in the early 1980s.
The political revolution of 1986 enhanced pluralist access to the
executive. Most importantly, the Aquino government was a large
coalition of diverse political parties and ideologies.
The only
commonality linking the various interests represented in the new
government was an opposition to Marcos. 25 As a result, the new
administration had to accommodate a multiplicity of political interests
simply to stay in power, Further, the 1987 Constitution explicitly
emphasized the importance of pluralism in the new government, leaving
room for civil society
to shape more easily the political decisions of
26
executive officials.'
Yet, it should be noted that the Aquino administration still
excluded most of the far left from its coalition of old Marcos
opponents. 127 This feature was significant because leftist groups such as
the National Democratic Front (NDF)-the political arm of the
communist New People's Army (NPA)-were some of the most strident
opponents of the U.S. military presence. The new government probably
faced little choice but to denounce such organizations because of its
122

See KESSLER, supra note 122, at 107-14, 124-25.
at 121-22.

'23 Id
124

125

d.
E.g., BRESNAN, supra note 107, at 189 (discussing divisions over how to deal

with the Communist Party of the Philippines and its militant arm); FRANCO,
supra note 102, at 208-09 (discussing the diversity of Aquino's coalition
government).
126 Karina Constantino-David, From the Present Looking Back, in ORGANIZING
FOR DEMOCRACY: NGOs, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE PHILIPPINE STATE 122, 288

(G. Sidney Silliman & Lela Garner Noble eds., 1998) (discussing, for example,
PHIL. CONST. Art. II, § 23; and Art. VI, § 5, 2).
127 See, e.g., DEGUZMAN & REFORMA, supra note 98, at 109-10 (explaining how
"extreme leftist parties" are "still prohibited from participating in any electoral
exercise under the [Aquino] administration").
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alliance with the United States and the geopolitics of the Cold War.
Thus, while the Aquino administration was more pluralistic than its
autocratic predecessor, it was not fully accessible to some of the most
devoted members of the anti-base movement.
d.

Availability of Demand-Aggregation
Mechanisms
The final Kitschelt criterion for openness-the availability of
mechanisms for aggregating citizen demands-also shifted toward
openness in the years leading up to 199 1. The Marcos regime repressed
most nongovernmental organizations.' 28 When citizen organizations did
operate, many of them were repressed by the Philippine military and
anti-communist vigilantes. 29 It was extremely difficult for the anti-base
movement to organize effectively in this setting.
As time passed, however, more and more tools became available
to opponents of the U.S. presence. One scholar notes that "immediately
after the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, NGOs mushroomed
throughout the country."'130
Anti-base organizations that did not
associate with the far left could now operate free from government
harassment. The government under Aquino "opened its doors to NGOs,
thereby providing spaces in the corridors of power."''
The 1987
Constitution not only protected these citizen groups by establishing
formal democratic institutions and respecting citizen rights, it explicitly
promoted NGO involvement in national politics. Article II section 23 of
28
1 Constantino-David,
29

1 See

KESSLER,

supra note 127, at 33-35.

supra note 122, at 139-40; see also Virginia A. Miralao & Ma.

Cynthia B. Bautista, The Growth and Changing Roles of NGOs and the

Voluntary Sector, 41 PHILIPPINE Soc. REV. 19, 19 (1993) (documenting a drastic
increase in the number of NGOs during the late 1980s and early 1990s).
Alex B.

Brillantes, Redemocratization and Decentralization in the
Philippines: The Increasing Leadership Role of NGOs, 60 INT'L REV. ADMIN.
130

Scr. 575, 578 (1994).
"' G. Sidney Silliman & Lela Garner Noble, Movements in Democracy, in
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43 (Silliman & Noble eds., 1998); see also Roland G. Simbulan,
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http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/september16.html (last visited Jan. 22,
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the document reads: "The state shall encourage non-governmental
organizations, community-based or sectoral organizations that promote
the welfare of the nation.' 32 By writing this provision into the
constitution and channeling financial resources to grassroots
organizations, the Aquino
administration demonstrated strong support for
33
a nascent civil society.
Smiled upon by the new regime, nongovernmental organizations
were able to exert substantial influence in domestic politics. They
"reshaped the public agenda, bringing to the fore issues that reflect[ed]
the concerns of those outside the narrow circle of socioeconomic elites.
[They] . . . broadened the range of interests reflected in the political
process. In addition, they ... achieved modest success in affecting the
outcomes of government decision-making."' 34 This progress represented
a clear shift toward regime openness. NGO members of the anti-base
movement should have enjoyed a significant increase in influence after
1986.
Changes in the Philippine judiciary during the 1980s also
promoted regime openness. Despite a prior reputation that "could have
been the envy of any court in the world," the Philippine judicial system
was largely defunct by 1986.135 Richard Kessler writes:
The absence of the rule of law destroyed the judiciary.
The use of preventive detention actions and emergency
decrees allowed Marcos to bypass both the
administrative and the criminal law systems. Gradually,
even these became irrelevant as the system rotted from

(1987) art. II, § 23.
Brillantes, supranote 131, at 579.
134 Silliman & Noble, supra note 132, at 291; see also J. Eliseo Rocamora,
132 PHIL. CONST.

133

PhilippineProgressiveNGOs in Transition: The New PoliticalTerrain of NGO
Development Work, 41 PHILIPPINE Soc. REv. 1, 4-5 (1993) (stating that NGOs

exercised "considerable influence in the shaping of national discourse");
Constantino-David, supra note 127, at 45-46 (stating that the influence of NGOs
in the Philippines was also a product of their professionalization).

135 C. Neal Tate, Courts and Breakdown and Re-creation of Philippine
Democracy: Evidencefrom the Supreme Court's Agenda, 49 INT'L SOC. SCI. J.

279, 282 (1997).
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within:6 the only basis for decisions became personal
ties.)
Marcos had packed the courts with largely subservient KBL
supporters, and the judiciary failed to challenge the legitimacy of his rule
throughout the 1980s. 137 Much like the Interim Batasang Pambansa, the
courts under Marcos were a "subservient, partial, rubber stamp for a
dictator, materially assisting in the breakdown of democracy."' 38 During
martial law, the Supreme Court failed to render a "single decision that
posed even a mild threat to Marcos's rule., 139 This acquiescence
"effectively removed the judiciary from a position of great institutional
significance in the Philippine polity."' 4 °
The powerlessness of the judicial system under Marcos
significantly impeded the ability of the courts to protect and mete out
justice. With judicial legitimacy undermined, citizens did not perceive
the courts as a mechanism for calling attention to injustice and
aggregating public demands. The judiciary's subservience to Marcos
was well-known, and citizens had little incentive to air grievances in
courts that were politically partisan. Even if an aggrieved group such as
the anti-base activists had decided to initiate court action, partisan courts
could have easily denied certiorari in order to limit public attention to the
issue.
In an attempt to restore the legitimacy of the judiciary, Corazon
Aquino called for the resignation of all Marcos's appointees and
nominated a new set of judges in 1986.141 The 1987 Constitution
supplemented these moves by placing the judicial branch within an
American-style system of checks and balances. Aquino's actions
strengthened the independence of the judiciary and restored the
KESSLER, supra note 122, at 125.
C. Neal Tate & Stacia L. Haynie, Authoritarianism and the Function of
Courts:A Time Series Analysis of the PhilippineSupreme Court, 1961-1987, 27
L. & Soc'Y REV. 707, 735 (1993).
138 Tate, supranote 136, at 285.
139 C. Neal Tate, Courts and Crisis Regimes: A Theory Sketch With Asian Case
136
137

Studies, 46 POL. RES. Q. 311, 327-28 (1993).
140Id at 328.
141Aquino Completes Refig of Supreme Court, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Apr.

17, 1986.
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Philippine Supreme Court as one of the "most powerful courts in the
world. 1 42 Accordingly, anti-base activists obtained a new and effective
mechanism for aggregating citizen demands. The Court was no longer a
puppet branch of the government, and aggrieved groups could again
expect impartial judgments.
ComparingRegime Openness in Okinawa and the
Philippines
In the case of Japan, several regime traits operated to limit
openness for the anti-base movement in Okinawa during the 1990s.
Such a finding helps to confirm the explanatory power of politicalopportunity-structure theory because it highlights several significant
structural impediments to effective mobilization in Japan.
In the Philippines, on the other hand, the regime was decidedly
closed in the early 1980s, restricting the anti-base movement's access to
the government in petitioning for change. However, regime openness
increased as the decade progressed in the Philippines under each of
Kitschelt's four criteria. This finding is also consistent with the
expectations of the concept of political opportunity structure; it seems
unlikely that base removal in 1991-a time when openness and
democratization had reached unprecedented levels in recent Philippine
history-was merely a chance event.
The Philippines and Okinawa, however, presented comparable
levels of regime openness in two of the four criteria consideredIn these
opposition party efficacy and legislative independence.
categories, both cases exhibited characteristics that typically limit
openness, and it is difficult to determine conclusively whether one case
rates more favorably than the other. Both cases exhibited a large number
of political parties that were often powerless and similar in ideological
position. Further, the marginal role of the institutionalized opposition
similarly contributed to weak measurements in the area of party efficacy
for both Okinawa and the Philippines.
For different reasons, the party systems in the two cases also did
not contribute to regime openness. As explained above, clan affiliation
and patronage networks, rather than policy and ideology, almost entirely
4.

142

Tate, supra note 136, at 284.

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP.

L. REv.

[VOL. 14:1

shaped the outcomes of Philippine elections. 43 To some extent, nonideological issues also shaped Japanese electoral outcomes, but probably
not to the degree that they did in the Philippines. Japanese voters seemed
to show less interest in clan and patronage, and in doing so, they
encouraged parties to organize around varying political and ideological
perspectives. Comparatively speaking, to the extent that Japanese parties
operated in this manner, the anti-base movement in Okinawa should have
found it easier to find a party concerned with the base issue.
It is clear, however, that the state of Japan's party system was
also relatively unfavorable for the anti-base movement. The LDP's
entrenched, hegemonic position undermined inter-party competition and
significantly limited regime openness by confining effective interest
articulation to a narrow group of party members and supporters.
Whether the Japanese LDP's hegemony and opposition's impotence or
the nascent state of the party system in the Philippines more significantly
impeded regime openness is difficult to determine. At the very least, no
case is clearly superior under this measurement.
It is also difficult to determine which case rates higher in the area
of legislative independence. The Philippines could receive the most
favorable characterization for a couple of reasons. First, Japan's
parliamentary system of government fuses many executive and
legislative functions, often purposefully undermining legislative
independence. This system contrasts starkly with the post-Marcos
regime established in the Philippines during the late 1980s. Aquino's
U.S.-style presidential system stressed the separation of powers between
branches of government. Second, as mentioned earlier, legislative
independence increased significantly in the Philippines as the 1980s
progressed. If favorable shifts in political opportunity structure are
themselves capable of facilitating movement success, this move toward
greater independence provides a second reason to believe that the
Philippines rates higher than Okinawa under Kitschelt's second criterion.
Still, the legislative branch was largely defunct in the Philippines
during the entire Marcos regime. It is also significant that, after Marcos,
the Batasang did not even operate until 1987. President Aquino ruled by
decree for the majority of her first year in office. Further, most of the
candidates in the 1987 national legislature backed the Aquino presidency
43

1

See GUTIERREZ et al., supranote 114, at 7.
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and thereby enabled the executive to exert more influence than would
have otherwise been possible. It is therefore difficult to determine which
case exhibited greater legislative independence. The methodological
limitations of this study make it too difficult to arrive at a decisive
conclusion.
Openness in terms of pluralist access to the executive, however,
was clearly higher in the Philippines. The Aquino administration was a
broad, ideologically diverse coalition of Marcos opponents that needed to
satisfy a variety of constituencies in order to retain power. Practical
necessity required the executive to respect a diversity of popular
interests. Aquino had to appease conservative and liberal interests
simply to prevent defections and coups throughout her administration.
Aquino herself, moreover, never claimed membership in any Philippine
political party because she hoped to establish herself as an apolitical
voice for all public interests. In contrast, the LDP dominated Japan's
bureaucracy, and even coalition governments such as the 1994
Murayama administration have been less diverse than the Philippine
government was under Aquino.
Finally, the Philippines also exhibited higher levels of openness
than Okinawa when measured by Kitschelt's fourth criterion. As noted
earlier, Aquino rule and the 1987 Constitution were overtly conciliatory
toward NGOs and other citizen organizations. The new, post-Marcos
government seemed to make concerted efforts to involve civil society in
its decisionmaking. No Japanese administration took such a clearly
favorable position toward citizen groups in the 1990s.
It is also likely that the Philippine judiciary in the late 1980s
viewed citizen movements more favorably than did its Japanese
counterpart. Aquino held a pluralist bias herself, and her administration
appointed judges who shared the president's perspective on
democracy. 144 Efforts to involve civil society and respect varying
political interests in her administration probably required Aquino to
appoint judges from all over the ideological spectrum.145 In light of these
144See

Mark Fineman, Acquittal of25 in Aquino Slaying Labeled 'Unspeakable
Affront'; Mistrial Declared, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1986, at I (describing the
Supreme Court's position in a case involving the murder of Benigno Aquino and
exposing Marcos's suppression ofjustices who challenged him).
145 See Aquino Completes Reig of Supreme Court, supra note 142 (describing
the backgrounds of Aquino appointees).
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changes, anti-base movement participants should have been able to use
the courts more frequently and effectively to further their cause. The
new judicial system was ideologically diverse, open and impartial, and a
viable avenue for calling attention to public grievances. Ramseyer &
Rasmusen's contention that conservative elites bias the Japanese judicial
system in favor of the status quo contrasts with the status of the
Philippine judiciary after Marcos. Japanese opponents of the U.S.
military presence have made some progress through litigation, but it is
still unclear whether the courts, recently willing to facilitate incremental
change, will act as a catalyst for more fundamental reform. Perhaps the
most we can say is that there was little evidence of progress through the
courts during the 1990s.
C.

The Impact of Elite Fragmentation on Anti-base Movement
Outcomes
Elite fragmentation is another regime characteristic that
determines the prospects for successful social mobilization. This
criterion has also been widely used by social movement theorists, and its
impact on movement outcomes has enjoyed some level of empirical
validation. 146 The following will define the fragmentation criterion,
explain its hypothesized impact on movement outcomes, and use it to
analyze anti-base movements in Okinawa and the Philippines.
Most scholars who have examined elite fragmentation in their
analyses on social movement outcomes agree:
When political, military, and economic elites are
cohesive, the political opportunities for challengers are
usually minimal; as elites fragment and come into
conflict, opportunities open; in rare cases, elite
fragmentation and conflict contribute to a regime crisis
so severe as to allow for a revolutionary outcome.... 147

See generally, e.g., Brockett, supra note 45, at 264-66; Davis, supra note 46,
at 375; Mario Diani, Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities.'
Insights from Regional Populism in Italy, 61 AM. SOC. REv. 1053, 1054-58
(1996).
147 Brockett, supra note 45, at 264.
146
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Elites can exist in a variety of forms: political, military, and
economic. However, since this Article has defined political opportunity
structure as a function of regime traits, the term "elites" will refer only to
individuals who occupy domestic government positions and wield some
measure of political influence.
The meaning of "fragmentation" also deserves some
clarification. Here, the term will refer to divisions between elites that
cannot be resolved by institutionalized political processes-differences
that could result in political instability or even violent conflict. In using
this rather extreme definition, this section avoids repeating the analysis
provided on regime openness. Moderate degrees of elite fragmentation
are to some extent implied by the existence of varying political parties
and pluralist access to the executive-variables that we have already
examined in detail.
The expectation that disunity among the elite correlates
positively with successful mobilization is logical for several reasons.
First, fragmentation and conflict among political leaders makes it easier
for regime challengers to influence the policymaking process. When
elites disagree with one another, they often find it necessary to seek
public support in order to legitimize their positions. In doing so, they
open up dialogue with varying interest groups that necessitates
bargaining and compromise over policy positions in exchange for public
support.
Second, elite fragmentation often occurs when officials disagree
over matters of policy, and disagreement implies the representation of
varying positions within government. Unified, politically homogenous
elites could only be more favorable for anti-base activists in cases where
each side shares a similar position on the issue at hand. For example,
although the level of elite cohesion generally correlates negatively with
movement success, one can still expect that a group of political leaders
unified in their support of the anti-base movement will be more helpful
for movement activists than a fragmented group of leaders who support
and oppose the presence of U.S. bases. In general, however, social
mobilization should not be necessary when popular policy outcomes also
enjoy unanimous elite support. The very existence of an organized
movement implies some measure of elite opposition to movement aims
and that the level of fragmentation among political leaders is therefore an
important variable.
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Third, it is possible that elite fragmentation and the instability it
produces will result in regime change and the complete replacement of
old leadership with officials who support the goals of various social
movements. Elite fragmentation and political instability may also
promote social unrest, a condition that often eases the difficulty of
recruitment for movement organizers. It is probably no coincidence that
mass protests and social mobilization commonly occur alongside regime
instability.
Citizens otherwise frightened away from movement
participation may find it easier to join activists when internal dissent
distracts a coercive regime.
Finally, non-institutionalized regime
change-such as revolution--could cast doubt on the legitimacy of prior
legal, social, and political arrangements made by the fallen government
and allow activists to critique the status quo with greater credibility.
1.
Elite Fragmentationin Okinawa
Even a quick historical review reveals that elite fragmentation
was non-existent in Japanese politics during the 1990s. Disagreements
certainly existed among political leaders, as shown by the existence of
varying policy-oriented political parties, but these disagreements did not
constitute fragmentation. In fact, with a government characterized by
limited pluralism and consistent LDP domination, Japan probably had,
and continues to have, one of the most cohesive groups of political elites
of any country in the world. It is also significant that institutionalized
political processes were capable of resolving disputes that accompanied
any lack of cohesion among the political elite. For example, even
Governor Ota-the fiercest opponent of the LDP elite majority on the
issue of base policy-ultimately acquiesced to the national leadership
after suffering a series of political defeats in his protests against Tokyo's
policies on U.S. military bases. 4 ' Economic carrots from the national
government also helped to ensure the acceptance of the status quo among
most Okinawan citizens. Institutional solutions were thus effective with
regard to one of the most heated disputes in Japanese politics.
This point probably does not need extensive evidentiary support
since it reflects widely known and, I think, accurate characterizations of
Japanese politics. In the 1990s, the country never experienced political
instability or even a remote threat of widespread violence. Muramatsu
148
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and Krauss's argument that Japan's government exhibited patterned
pluralism is probably only possible because of such stability." 9 Elite
alignments and cohesion were so consistent in the country that pluralism
could congeal and take a patterned form. If fragmentation had been
present, it is doubtful that the makeup of the Japanese political elite
could have remained so stable.
The absence of fragmentation in Japanese politics should have
hurt the Okinawan anti-base movement for the theoretical reasons
described above. Some empirical evidence validates this conclusion.
The general preference for the maintenance of U.S. bases on the part of
Japan's political elite made the national government largely unresponsive
to movement demands. The only change to occur in base policy
happened as a result of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO) in 1996, but SACO failed to produce significant shifts in the
presence of U.S. forces during the 1990s. 50 Politicians had little reason
to appeal for the support of anti-base activists when they, their
opponents, and the majority of Japanese citizens preferred, or were
indifferent to, the presence of U.S. bases. In this way, the movement was
largely a non-factor in national politics. Elites were relatively united in
the way they ignored the demands of base opponents. Assemblyman
worked with anti-base
Kinjo's observation that only far-left parties
51
condition.'
this
of
evidence
further
is
NGOs
2.
Elite Fragmentationin the Philippines
Despite appearances to the contrary, the Philippine anti-base
movement under Marcos was far more fortunate than its Okinawan
counterpart was during the 1990s. While Marcos's rule was autocratic
and based on nepotism and the threat of force, he nevertheless failed to
create a cohesive body of elites who would support his agenda. A large
band of mid-level and low-level political and military leaders who often

Muramatsu & Krauss, supra note 78, at 517.
"" Okinawans Tell US Base: Your Time is Up-Get Out!, MAIN1CHI
DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 2335479 (noting that the
SACO deadline for base relocation has not been met).
15 Kinjo, supranote 87.
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opposed the regime surrounded a core of elite Marcos supporters.' 52 The
opposition of these leaders was not simply disagreement over policy;
rather, it was conflict over the basis for Marcos's rule and the
fundamental determinants of good governance. Furthermore, high levels
of military corruption deeply troubled a substantial number of leaders
within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Eventually, this
tension caused the dissatisfied groups within the military to organize the
Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). 5 3 While sounding
relatively moderate in aim, RAM not only worked to change the
operation of the military; several of its leaders actually conspired to
overthrow the Marcos regime.1 54 The creation of RAM is evidence of
the elite fragmentation that occurred under Marcos's rule.
Elite fragmentation also emerged in other areas; "latent divisions
[existed] within the regime between hardliners and soft-liners" on
matters of political freedom.' 55 Other elites vehemently opposed the
government's involvement in electoral fraud. 156 By the early 1980s,
these divisions generated a destabilizing wave of elite defections that
included prominent politicians such as some members of the Laurel
family and Gerardo Roxas.' 7 Increasingly common and deep rifts
afflicted the Marcos regime as the decade progressed. It is therefore
unsurprising that revolution replaced Marcos with Corazon Aquino in
1986. The regime's divisions became so endemic that they resulted in
complete regime change.
Yet, this change in power did not reduce elite fragmentation.
Aquino weathered six coup attempts during her first few years in
office.' 58 The new president also had to manage a broad coalition of old

152 See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 122, at 128-30 (describing how mid-level

military officials opposed Marcos's use of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP)).
"'
KESSLER, supra note 122, at 128-35.
154 Id at 130.
155
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156 1d at 146-47.

117Id. at 156, 162.

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 1998-99: Philippines, at
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Marcos opponents that shared almost no political commonalities.' 59
Clashes between reform and conservative, civilian and military, and softline and hard-line elements of Aquino's government occurred on a
regular basis. "The only bond that kept the alliance together was their
60
disdain for Marcos and their opposition to his authoritarian rule.'
Once Marcos was deposed, the coalition lost its sole point of ideological
unity and splintered, allowing elite fragmentation in the Philippines to
persist.
Given continued elite fragmentation within the Aquino
government, two hypotheses could explain the Philippine anti-base
movement's ultimate success in 1991. First, fragmentation replaced the
pro-base regime of Marcos with a new government that showed
sympathy for the anti-base movement and less support for the Military
Base Agreement.' 6 1 Second, the Philippine elite and public widely
discounted the legitimacy of Marcos's rule and the old government.
Under either view, it is likely that many perceived the Marcos-era legal
arrangements and negotiations to continue the U.S. base presence as
illegitimate. That perception made it easier for the Senate to reject the
1991 base agreement.
ComparingElite Fragmentationin Okinawa andthe
Philippines
Stark differences in elite fragmentation in Okinawa and the
Philippines make it easy to validate the theory of political opportunity
structure for each individual case as well as on a comparative level. The
Philippine political elite were highly fragmented and unstable, while
their Japanese counterparts were consistently cohesive. Revolutionary
change in 1986 and subsequent instability under Aquino showed that
Philippine politics was extremely fluid and dynamic. During the late
1980s and early 1990s, there were very few, if any, sacred political
realities, including the long-established presence of the U.S. military.
3.

159Joel
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160
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D.

The Impact of Elite Allies on Anti-base Movement Outcomes
The presence or absence of elite allies is arguably the most'
logical and important determinant of movement success.
Even
movements with few members and poor organization can ultimately
achieve their aims if they obtain the support of powerful political elites.
Likewise, wealthy and widely popular social movements can fail if they
are unable to ally with policymakers. Various studies have affirmed this
correlation and this Section applies it to anti-base movements.163 The
Section will follow the format of the previous two and begin by defining
the criterion, later briefly explaining its rationale, and finally applying it
to anti-base movements in Okinawa and the Philippines.
The rationale behind the elite-allies criterion is that movements
allied with powerful officials are more likely to succeed because elites
have direct access to the policymaking process. In addition, elite allies
can shape the opinions of their colleagues to generate broad support for
activist aims, and they can provide financial resources to improve
movement organization and recruitment. The absence of elite allies'
support for a movement makes acquiring such benefits relatively
difficult.
1.
Elite Allies in Okinawa
The anti-base movement in Okinawa had some elite supporters,
but they were not numerous or influential enough to generate significant
policy change.
Through a variety of means, the pro-base LDP
marginalized organizations and individuals who supported base
opponents in Japan.
The Okinawa case seems to support the
hypothesized correlation between elite allies and movement success
because the prefecture's unsuccessful movement largely operated
without the support of influential political elites during the 1990s.
Ota Masahide, the former Governor of Okinawa from 1990 to
1998, probably offered the most tenacious support for his prefecture's
163 See, e.g., Nella Van Dyke, The Effects of Elite Allies and Antagonists on
Student Protest in the United States, 1930-1990, in STATES, PARTIES, AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 226, 226 (Jack A. Goldstone ed., 2003) (noting that the

correlation between the presence of elite allies and successful mobilization is
well-documented); J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the
Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1947-1972), 42 AM. SOC. REV. 249, 253
(1977) (discussing generally the importance of external support).
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opposition to U.S. bases. From 1995 to 1998, the governor "explored a
variety of avenues" to advance the movement. 64 These avenues
included direct participation in citizen protests, meeting with national
officials to press for policy change, refusing to fulfill legal obligations
that would sustain the U.S. base presence, traveling to Washington to
on behalf of
discuss the base issue with American officials, and arguing
65
Okinawan residents before the Japanese Supreme Court.1
However, apart from Ota's efforts, the anti-base movement
received virtually no direct support from Japan's political elite.
Chalmers Johnson writes that Ota was "perhaps the only Japanese
politician in living memory who . ..both paid attention to what the
people who elected him wanted him to do and who did not betray them
when faced with bureaucratic resistance."1 66 For example, socialist
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, a person who once took a clear
anti-base position, ultimately did little more than "express his sympathy
with the plight of Okinawans.,' ' 67 When Ota lost his position as governor
to Inamine Keiichi in November 1998, the LDP-backed Inamine quickly
"became the spearhead of a movement to neutralize base opposition
through a transformation of Okinawa's collective identity and historical
consciousness.' 68 Inamine served this function by encompassing
Okinawa within a homogenous nationalist framework that deemphasized
the preferences of Okinawan citizens and secured the island's unique
position in U.S. military strategy. 69 The anti-base movement thus lost
critical support once Ota left office.
If the elite-allies criterion has a meaningful impact on political
opportunity structure for anti-base movements, then Okinawa's anti-base
movement should have seen the most success during Ota's
administration. Some evidence supports this expectation. First, the
governor's refusal to sign proxy land-lease documents in 1995 sparked a
genuine political crisis for the national government.170 Ota's action
'4 SMITH,
6
1 5 1d

supra note 65, at 75.
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raised questions about the constitutionality of the basing arrangement
and put Tokyo on the defensive. As a result of his protests, the national
government felt pressured to address Okinawan concerns and, however
minimal in substantive impact, thereafter established a consultative
mechanism between the central government and the prefecture to deal
with base issues. 71 The SACO committee, mentioned earlier, is
arguably another result of Ota's work) 72 Second, the governor's efforts
"focused national attention on the impact of bases" and raised a new
level of consciousness concerning the issue on the Japanese mainland. 73
In light of these facts, it is probably no coincidence that the most
significant national efforts to reduce the burden of U.S. bases on
Okinawa occurred during the Ota administration.
Despite Ota's efforts, the Okinawa anti-base movement never
achieved success during the 1990s. The analysis from Section II might
help to explain why. Okinawa had a relatively closed political
opportunity structure in terms of Kitschelt's "pluralist access to the
executive" criterion. Japan's government was relatively centralized and
left little room for local authorities to influence base policy. In this
setting, a local ally even more devoted than Ota might have never
significantly contributed to the protest efforts of Okinawan residents.
The movement, on this view, did not have the right elite allies--Ota was
an influential politician, but the marginalized role of local government in
base policy formulation ultimately undermined his ability to effect
significant change.174
The efforts of Governor Ota may illustrate a second important
issue concerning the role of elite allies in Okinawa's anti-base
movement. Many argue that Inamine's 1998 victory in the gubernatorial
election was the product of Ota's excessively antagonistic approach to
the base problem in his past interactions with Tokyo. 75 At issue was the
fear that poor relations between Naha (Okinawa's capital) and Tokyo
would jeopardize valuable development assistance from the national
171

See id. at 97-98.

See id at 99 n.49 (describing pressure from Governor Ota as partially
responsible for the SACO).
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government. Okinawans appreciated Ota's support, but only to the
extent that it did not undermine the economic status quo. 176 Thus, it
seems clear that not only did Okinawan activists need elite allies to
position themselves appropriately within Japanese government; they also
needed allies that were not overzealous in their support for base removal.
Individuals such as Ota had to walk a political tight rope between an
inadequate campaign for base removal that risked accusations of
insensitivity toward a pressing social problem, and an overzealous
promotion of removal that risked economic growth and healthy relations
with Tokyo.
2.
Elite Allies in the Philippines
During the Marcos Era, the anti-base movement in the
Philippines had very few, if any, supporters in the highest levels of
government. As noted earlier, Marcos appointed close friends and
relatives to all of the government's key political positions. Doing so
helped him to foster unanimous devotion to his rule and policy among
the powerful elite, and made it difficult for the anti-base movement to
attract influential allies. Marcos and his circle of supporters consistently
maintained a pro-base position and forced base opponents to look outside
of government in forging alliances to promote their aims. 7 7 If the
Marcos regime had remained stable, political opportunity structure
should have remained closed under the elite-allies criterion.
However, the allegiance of mid-level elites began to falter in the
early 1980s. This change allowed the anti-base movement to lobby
178
political leaders who had become disenchanted with the status quo.
Contributing to the effectiveness of activists' lobbying efforts, elite
dissenters were often open to anti-base views simply because they
disliked anything tied to Marcos. "[M]ost of [Marcos's] opposition came
to assume a position critical of the American military presence" largely
because "Marcos remained a staunch advocate of the U.S.-Philippine
Kevin Sullivan, Critic of US.Bases Loses Okinawa Governorship, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 1998, at A21.
177 GREGOR & AGANON, supra note 97, at
14.
178 See FRANCO, supra note 102, at 156 (explaining that the "early 1980s
was the
time when the 'old pattern of defections' by members of the political elite from
the ruling party first began to appear").
176
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security arrangements."' 7 9 Elite allies thus became more numerous for
the anti-base movement as the decade progressed. The weakening of
Marcos's hold on power created opportunities for base opponents to ally
with important policymakers
such as Salvador Laurel, Jovito Salonga,
80
and Gerardo Roxas.'
The fall of Marcos in 1986 contributed still further to this shift in
political opportunity structure. While working as the leader of the
unofficial anti-Marcos resistance in 1984, Corazon Aquino committed
herself to the complete removal of all foreign troops from the soil of the
Philippines.'" Now she was running the government. Further, "many in
her entourage were opposed to the U.S. military presence as a matter of
principle," including Presidential Advisor Lorenzo Tanada, 8Finance
2
Minister Jami Ongpin, and Minister of Agriculture Ramon Mitra1
It is important, however, not to exaggerate the support that these
leaders provided.
Soon after entering office, Aquino began to
reformulate her opposition to the bases in order to avoid alarming the
U.S. government. Instead of repeating early statements of opposition,
she asserted that American bases would remain until the expiration of the
Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 1991, after which all options would
be open. 83 The political and economic importance of healthy relations
with Washington required Aquino to temper her idealism and abandon
some of the more radical elements of her early platform. In doing so, she
also abandoned some of her most liberal supporters. Joel Rocamora
notes that "the Aquino regime's slide to the right... started by autumn
of her first year in office. Over the course of the next two years, the
more progressive members of [her] cabinet were slowly eased out [and]
her reformist policies reversed ....
Coalition viability may have been the biggest reason for
Aquino's "slide to the right." Military leaders in the Philippines wanted
the bases to stay for the logistical support they provided to the army, and
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85
Aquino needed the support of the military in order to retain power.'
High-ranking officials such as Vice President Salavador Laurel and the
pro-base Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile had initially challenged
Aquino in her bid for the presidency.18 6 Aquino bad to be particularly
sensitive to their preferences and questionable loyalty.
In summary, looking solely at the executive branch, it appears
that elite allies decreased in number and grew weaker in their support for
the anti-base movement between 1986 and 1991. This observation does
not translate into a particularly favorable political opportunity structure.
At the same time, political opportunity structure during Aquino may
have still been more favorable under the elite-allies criterion than it was
during Marcos. After shifting toward the right and abandoning its most
liberal members, the Aquino regime's support for the anti-base
movement turned out to be lukewarm. However, extremely weak
support--or even no support at all-was still more favorable for base
opponents than the Marcos regime's overt support of the U.S. presence.
It is also important to apply the elite-allies criterion to the
legislative branch of the Philippine government, particularly for the years
following Marcos's rule. The immediate post-Marcos period was a
political era characterized by an empowered legislative branch that
played a critical role in the ultimate removal of U.S. bases.' 7 The
presence of significantly larger numbers of anti-base movement allies in
the Aquino Batasang would further validate the concept of political
opportunity structure.
As the concept would expect, the number of elite allies to the
anti-base movement increased within the legislative branch as the 1980s
progressed and as Marcos and KBL dominance declined. Initially, very
few movement allies existed within the national assembly. The 1978
Interim Batasang elections placed the KBL in a hegemonic position, with
the party controlling 150 out of 165 seats.18 8 Even though some of the
remaining fifteen seats were filled with assemblymen who supported the
goals of the movement, the Marcos regime's propensity for intimidating
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and coercing political opponents made it difficult for the these leaders to
provide substantive support.'8 9
The 1984 Batasang election placed a far larger number of
movement allies in power; non-KBL candidates-mainly from the
United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and the Partido
Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) parties-won
sixty of the 183 contested seats. 9° With the safety of numbers, elected
opposition representatives found it possible to support the anti-base
movement with little risk of retaliation. Sixty-one seats also commanded
far more respect in the legislative process. For these reasons, political
opportunity structure became somewhat more favorable with the creation
of the 1984 assembly. The number of potential elite allies in the
legislative branch expanded to include opposition party leaders such as
Jose Cojuangco and Agapito Aquino.191
The 1986 revolution and the subsequent promulgation of the
1987 Constitution produced another unprecedented number of potential
movement allies. Not only was there now a bicameral legislature that
included a twenty-four member senate; Aquino-backed candidates "saw
an overwhelming victory" at the polls. 192 Dethroning the overtly probase KBL, the Lakas ng Baya-a coalition of PDP-Laban and UNIDO
leaders-won twenty-two of twenty-four Senate seats and Aquino
93
supporters won 142 of 200 seats in the new House of Representatives.
Many of Aquino's legislative allies were at least initially anti-base, and
those who "slid to the right" with the executive branch were often still
more inclined to support the anti-base movement than the old KBL elite.
The 1987 elections thus produced a national legislature whose members
were more willing to ally with base opponents.
Several scholars argue that despite drastic changes, the country's
legislative branch remained essentially conservative. Julio Teehankee
notes that 83% of the 1987 House of Representatives "were drawn from
See, e.g., BRESNAN, supra note 107, at 82 (noting Marcos's efforts to
intimidate legislative opponents).
190 FRANCO, supra note 102, at 170.
191 Id.at 169-70.
192 Julio Teehankee, Electoral Politics in the Philippines, in ELECTORAL
POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST & EAST ASIA 149, 164 (Aurel Croissant ed., 2002),
available at http://library.fes.de/fulltext/iez/01361inf.htm.
193See id at 164-65.
189
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the ranks of the elite in Philippine society."' 94 These individuals
included relatives of traditional political families, old members of the
1978 Interim Batasang, former local officials during the Marcos regime,
and wealthy business executives. Many of these figures had vested
interests in the maintenance of the status quo, making it questionable
whether they would support reforms such as base removal.
More broadly, A.B. Villanueva points out that "democratic
political institutions restored by Aquino and her moribund coalition
[were) biased in favor of democratic elitism. In turn, democratic elitism
[was] biased in favor of non-decision-making."' 95 If this description is
accurate, elite allies were not as numerous as the election outcomes
seemed to show. Opposition to the KBL did not necessarily correlate
with anti-base views. On this view, the backgrounds of Aquino
supporters belied their reformist aims.
Yet there is reason to doubt such a conclusion. In one sense, it
was precisely the Senate's preference for non-decision-making that
enabled it to reject the proposal to extend the base agreement.
Negotiations during the 1960s had established the 1991 time limit on the
U.S. presence.'
Senate rejection of the treaty to extend the time limit
by ten years was simply a "non-decision" to retain the status quo; it did
not require any additional policymaking, as the 1991 limit had formally
been government policy for decades.
Widespread bias for non-decision-making in Philippine politics,
however, did not mean that elite allies were irrelevant to the anti-base
movement. Indeed, it is likely that Marcos and his supporters would
have extended the 1991 time limit if they had remained in power. Bases
in the Philippines remained vital strategic assets to the United States
even after the Cold War, and the United States would have probably used
its close relationship with Marcos to ensure the extension of the base
agreement. By refusing U.S. pressure and allowing the base leases to
expire, the post-Marcos political elite functioned as an invaluable asset to
the anti-base movement. Further, the conservatism that Villanueva
points out did not necessarily contradict the goal of base removal.
" Id.at 165.

195A.B. Villanueva, Post-Marcos: The State of Philippine Politics and
Democracy During the Aquino Regime, 1986-92, 14 CONTEMPORARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA 174, 184 (1992).
196 BERRY,

supra note 14, at 99-100.
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Nationalism had blossomed after Marcos, and it was possible for many
politicians to maintain conservative platforms while rejecting the base
agreement in the name of Philippine sovereignty and anti-colonialism.1 97
If these views are correct, elite allies in both the legislative and
executive branches played a critical role in the success of the Philippine
anti-base movement. Opponents of the 1966 MBA became more strident
and numerous as the 1980s progressed, and the 1986 People Power
Revolution produced a new government that on balance supported the
movement's goals. The general "slide to the right" of the Aquino regime
did not completely undermine this support.
3.
ComparingElite Allies in Okinawa and the Philippines
Findings on elite allies in both cases appear to support the theory
of political opportunity structure. Okinawa's anti-base movement had
very few, if any, committed elite allies, while the Philippine movement
made demands on a government whose executive and legislative
branches were at least initially filled with anti-base politicians after 1986.
The findings also validate the explanatory power of politicalWhereas
opportunity-structure analysis on a comparative level.
Okinawan activists' main elite ally was a single governor operating in a
relatively centralized national government, Philippine base opponents
enjoyed varying levels of support from the country's president, several
members of her cabinet, and prominent members of the legislative
branch. With such powerful allies, Philippine activists did not even need
the support of local elites. Although Aquino and her administration were
less hostile toward the U.S. military presence after taking office, their
platform was still more favorable for base opponents than the Japanese
LDP's overt support for the status quo in Okinawa.
The Philippine movement may have been able to attract greater
numbers of influential elite allies because it operated on behalf of a
national constituency. This Section has argued that the Okinawan and
Philippine movements were largely similar in focus, intensity, and
tactics, but it is also true that they have had vastly different citizen
support networks. Philippine protesters were able to build a national
support grid because citizens widely recognized the U.S. presence as an
affront to Philippine sovereignty. While the U.S, has positioned bases all
19 7

See id. at 296, 310.
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over Japan, apsproximately 75% of the U.S. military presence is located
in Okinawa.' s This situation created the impression among Japanese
citizens that the base problem was uniquely Okinawan. Certainly, there
were Okinawa sympathizers on the mainland, but their support was
limited by spatial distance and, to a degree, cultural rift. In this way,
anti-base activists in Okinawa faced recruitment hurdles that never
troubled their Philippine counterparts. It is probably no coincidence that
the regionally focused Okinawan movement was only able to attract
regional elite allies such as Governor Ota. In contrast, the Philippine
movement fed on a wide-ranging sense of nationalism that enabled
organizers to recruit the most valuable elite allies-national leaders who
could actually change base policy.

198 GLENN D. HOOK & RICHARD SIDDLE, JAPAN & OKINAWA: STRUCTURE &

SUBJECTIVITY 3 (2003).
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Conclusions on the Utility of Political-Opportunity-Structure
Analysis
Table 1
Conclusion Summary on Components of Political Opportunity
Structure
(Non-Comparative Findings)
Component
Okinawa (1992-Present)
Regime Openness
Unfavorable
# of Influential Parties
Unfavorable
Legislative Independence Mixed
Pluralist Access to Exec.
Mixed
Demand Agg. Mechanisms Unfavorable

Philippines (1981-1991)
Increasingly Favorable
Unfavorable
Increasingly Favorable
Increasingly Favorable
Increasingly Favorable

Elite Fragmentation

Unfavorable

Favorable

Elite Allies

Unfavorable

Increasingly Favorable

Table 1 shows that the concept of political opportunity structure
is capable of explaining movement outcomes in the two cases under
nearly every application of the measurement criteria. During the 1990s,

* Table 1 summarizes the status of each independent variable in the test cases of
Okinawa and the Philippines.
For simplicity, the conclusions on each
component of political opportunity structure are characterized as either
"favorable," "increasingly favorable," "mixed," or "unfavorable." These terms
are relative and somewhat vague, but they are based on the standardized
measurements established in preceding sections and are useful for quick
summary. A "favorable" categorization means that the conclusions on a given
component would predict anti-base movement success. An "unfavorable" rating
means the opposite. Also, the terms are not meant to have comparative value.
"Increasingly favorable," for example, does not necessarily translate into a more
facilitative political opportunity structure in absolute terms than does
"unfavorable." The prior applies simply to mean that structural conditions
improved for a given movement over time.
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Okinawa's largely unsuccessful anti-base movement operated within a
structure that was mostly unfavorable to effective social mobilization.
On the other hand, the successful Philippine protest movement operated
in structural conditions that became increasingly auspicious as the 1980s
progressed.
Table 2
Conclusion Summary on Components of
Political Opportunity Structure
(Direct Comparison)
Component
Regime Openness

Case With Highest Absolute Favorability
Philippines

# of Influential Parties

Undecided

Legislative Independence
Pluralist Access to Exec.
Demand Aggregation Mechanisms

Undecided
Philippines
Philippines

Elite Fragmentation

Philippines

Elite Allies

Philippines

Only two sub-criteria pose challenges to the explanatory power
of the test concept:
legislative independence and the number of
influential political parties. As Table 2 indicates, the Philippines
exhibited a more favorable political opportunity structure in absolute
terms under all but these two criteria. Methodological limitations made
it too difficult to conclude decisively whether one case exhibited higher
favorability under either of these measurements. Despite the existence of
significant bureaucratic influence in the Japanese Diet and Japan's use of
a parliamentary system, the Philippine Batasang was entirely dependent
on the Marcos autocracy until 1986 and Aquino decree-rule until 1987.
Moreover, although the LDP wielded hegemonic influence in Japanese
politics during the 1990s, the Philippine party system was so nascent in
the latter half of the 1980s that parties only weakly operated as tools for
base opponents.
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PART IH: USING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE IN
MILITARY BASE AGREEMENT DRAFTING AND POLICYMAKING
As noted earlier, the United States is currently in the middle of a
significant shift in its forward deployment strategy that involves the
creation of new military installations around the globe. Much like U.S.
bases of the twentieth century, these new facilities will encounter protest
from the citizens of receiving states, especially since anti-American
sentiment is strong in many parts of the world. The United States and
receiving states would profit significantly if they had the ability to
anticipate successful anti-base protest in the years to come. The analysis
in Part II suggests that the concept of political opportunity structure
could enhance precisely this ability.
Political opportunity structure may be a particularly useful
concept now because the presence of the U.S. military is arguably a
greater liability to host nations today than it was during the Cold War. In
recent years, the international reputation of the United States has fallen
and made it more costly to ally with the United States. Terrorist
organizations kill citizens and attack the territory of U.S. allies.
Receiving states are reasonably concerned that hosting the U.S. military
will turn them into targets for attack.' 99 In this setting, anti-base protests
could become common.
The case studies in Part II offer some guidelines for the
policymakers and negotiators who will grapple with the discontent
generated by new and existing U.S. bases. Most importantly, the United
States should not always aim for the most favorable agreements possible.
Although Washington may win with this approach in the short term, it
may also produce a base configuration that is untenable in the long run if
the political opportunity structures of receiving states are conducive to
successful anti-base protest. The key is to tailor the new base
agreements to the political opportunity structures of host countries. If the
structure in a given country is favorable, as it was in the Philippines
during the 1980s, the life of an agreement will be precarious, and the
United States should negotiate with greater deference to the demands of
local citizens. If the political opportunity structure is not conducive to

& SIDDLE, supra note 199, at 242-44 (describing how the
September 11th "terrorist attacks .. .laid bare the continuing dependency,
199See, e.g., 1400K

fragility, and ultimate vulnerability" of Okinawa).
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successful social anti-base protest, as was the case in Okinawa during the
1990s, such deference will be less necessary as a practical matter.
An analysis of political opportunity structure should also
influence whether and how U.S. officials revise existing base
agreements. The mere presence of an anti-base movement should not
necessarily trigger amendments, since, depending on structural context, a
movement may or may not have the ability to succeed. Well-informed
changes will have considered the political opportunity structure of the
receiving state in addition to the legal and normative problems related to
an existing agreement. In situations where legal or ethical perspectives
do not unambiguously favor one type of amendment, policymakers may
examine structural context to determine the appropriate course of action.
Political opportunity structure is, at the very least, a secondary
consideration that officials should use to tilt the balance in favor of one
among several comparably valid reform options.
One way to understand political opportunity structure and its
implications is to view it as a determinant of bargaining power. If
unfavorable political opportunity structures coincide with unsuccessful
social mobilization, as was the case in Okinawa during the 1990s, the
bargaining power of sending state negotiators increases when a receiving
state exhibits structural traits that are not conducive to successful social
mobilization. As noted above, these traits include a lack of regime
openness, unity among the political elite, and an absence of elite allies.
Representatives of receiving states that exhibit these characteristics
cannot persuasively point to the potential for unrest or popular discontent
as a basis for inserting the legal provisions that they desire. Social
movements in these states are unlikely to gain enough influence to
necessitate concessions by the sending state.
On the other hand, a favorable political opportunity structure in a
receiving state reduces the bargaining power of the United States during
negotiations. Much like the Philippines during the late 1980s, a state
with a structural context that is amenable to successful social
mobilization can persuasively demand terms that it desires by pointing to
its own vulnerability. In countries where the governing regime is open
or making significant movements toward openness, where the elite is
fragmented, or where an anti-base movement has elite allies, negotiators
can point out that U.S. inflexibility on agreement terms could mobilize
influential social movements and reduce the popularity of the pro-U.S.
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regime in power. Ultimately, such a result could require treaty
renegotiation or even base removal.
Those who use political opportunity structure to understand and
predict anti-base movement outcomes should also realize that different
aspects of the concept may be useful at different stages during the life of
an agreement. For example, regime openness may be uniquely helpful
during the drafting stage because its relatively static quality allows it to
facilitate long-term predictions more effectively than the other variables.
Changes in a receiving state's openness will be rare and often glacial
even when they occur. In contrast, changes in elite allies and elite
fragmentation may occur rapidly, making these variables less reliable as
long-term indicators of political opportunity structure. The utility of
these two variables may be limited to informing short-term decisions on
whether to amend existing agreements that face rising local opposition.
Applying the foregoing analysis to the negotiation and
administration of base agreements would carry several advantages. Most
importantly, it would help U.S. officials to produce better-adapted initial
agreements, in turn reducing the need for amendments later on and
simplifying the task of base management. Political-opportunity-structure
analysis would also benefit host citizens where structural conditions are
conducive to successful social mobilization. Finally, as a product of
these effects, use of the concept by U.S. officials could help to produce a
forward deployment that is palatable to the citizens of receiving states,
durable, and still useful to the United States.
Admittedly, applying political opportunity structure does pose
some difficulties. The two case studies provided in this Article do not
firmly establish causality between the various structural conditions and
movement outcomes. From this study alone, it is also not clear which
components of political opportunity structure exert the greatest influence
on movement outcomes. In some host states, moreover, political
opportunity structure may evolve only after the United States and host
government have negotiated an agreement. Agreements in those cases
will become inapt even if officials originally negotiated with an accurate
view of structural context. All of these issues make the concept more
difficult to use.
However, these problems at best mitigate the utility of a
sociologically-informed approach to negotiating military base
agreements. Comparative analyses on other states where anti-base
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movements have experienced varying levels of success could corroborate
the findings above. U.S. officials who apply political opportunity
structure will still enter negotiations with a greater understanding of their
own bargaining power and the constraints faced by representatives of the
potential receiving state. Moreover, negotiating with even snapshot
pictures of a kinetic structural context is still preferable to disregarding
political structures altogether.
Despite its limitations, politicalopportunity-structure analysis provides what has been a missing
sociological perspective on military base policy, and using it to inform
the ongoing reconfiguration of bases could produce a durable forward
deployment strategy that is less burdensome to receiving states.

